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INTRODUCTION: JESUS, THE JURY, AND JAIL
The right of devoutly religious people to serve on juries is a
recurring subject of legal commentary. This issue usually arises
with respect to peremptory challenges to remove a juror. Peremp-
* Michael Hatfield (J.D., New York University), Professor of Law, Texas Tech
University. I am especially grateful for the guidance of Professor Vaughn James
and Professor Jared Gonzalez both of Texas Tech University School of Law, and
for the tremendous research assistance of Dean Davenport, Elizabeth Henderson,
and Kyle Kovel. I would also like to express my gratitude for the guidance of
Professor Jeffrey A. Bach, Director of the Young Center for Anabaptist and Pietist
Studies of Elizabethtown College. All errors and omissions are mine.
1. See, e.g., Anthony D. Foti, Case Brief, Could Jesus Serve on a Jury? Not in the
Third Circuit: Religion-Based Peremptory Challenges in United States v. Dejesus &
Bronhstein v. Horn, 51 ViuL. L. REv. 1057 (2006); Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory
269
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tory challenges by attorneys reflect their decisions as to which po-
tential jurors are most likely to disfavor their clients.2 Predictably,
the challenges are often based on stereotypes. This raises the con-
stitutional issue: can peremptory challenges be based on religious
stereotypes? 3 Thus far, the Supreme Court of the United States has
prohibited peremptory challenges based on race, but not based on
religion.4 The resulting concern is that some Americans may be
impermissibly denied the ability to participate in jury service be-
cause of their religious devotion.
While the concern over religiously devout Americans who wish
to serve on juries is a serious one, a potential juror dismissed from
service over his or her religiosity suffers a real but relatively abstract
damage. The punishment is being sent home when they want to
stay. This Article examines a different issue with more severe conse-
quences: religiously devout citizens who risk being jailed for refus-
ing to serve on ajury. Rather than asking whetherJesus could serve
on a jury,5 this Article addresses whether we should force Jesus to
serve if he said God told him not to.
More specifically, this Article addresses whether we should
force those who refuse to serve to serve because they say Jesus told
them not to serve to participate injury duty nonetheless. In 2007, a
plainly dressed young father of three was jailed in Texas because he
failed to discharge his duties as a juror.6 As a matter of faith, this
young man, a traditional Anabaptist (a Mennonite), refuses to util-
ize the court system, benefit from any insurance (even the required
automobile liability insurance), receive government payments, or
vote. Consistent with these beliefs, and out of the same sincere con-
viction that he is doing no more than what the teachings of Jesus
require, he refused to vote as a juror. He was sentenced to thirty
days in jail and served four.
While it is remarkable that an American would be jailed for
refusing to violate a sincerely held religious principle, especially
when many other potential jurors successfully abdicate their service
Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are They Constitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv
139 (2005).
2. See Foti, supra note 1, at 1060-61.
3. See id. at 1057-59.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. The following story is one with which I have personal familiarity, although I
refrain from disclosing further details out of respect for this individual's privacy.
Anyone interested in a more detailed account should contact me directly.
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requirement for less than sincere reasons, 7 it is not the raw ele-
ments of injustice in the case that are most noteworthy. Perhaps
the most remarkable aspect is that neither this man nor his congre-
gation bore any ill will towards those who jailed him. Their under-
standing was simply that the judge was following the law. The
man's religious objection to service had been lost to the judge and
the lawyers involved because the issue never surfaced during voir
dire. A general question to elicit hardship-based excuses was asked,
but the scrupulously honest man did not equate his religious con-
viction with a hardship. By the time he sensed a point of no return
had passed, he had been assigned to a jury. Despite his objections
to the judge, the judge informed him there was no remedy. When
he refused to vote on the verdict, he was jailed. Four days later,
after intervention from the congregational leadership, he was
released.
This should have been avoided, but it was not. Had the judge
known of the religious objection, he could have exercised his dis-
cretion to excuse the juror.8 Had the judge asked, he would have
been told. No attorney would want anyone conscientiously op-
posed to jury service to serve on a jury since, by definition, they will
be obstinate jurors. But neither attorney asked the venire panel if
anyone was so opposed. Had the juror interrupted at any point, he
could have declared his opposition. But interruption is not some-
thing favored in courts and certainly not favored by the juror's non-
resistant religious culture. Thus, he was jailed. From his perspec-
tive, the costs of his conscience are not to be counted. From the
public perspective, however, the waste of time and resources and
jailing of anyone acting out of sincere religious conviction is offen-
sive, especially given how easily it could be avoided by a categorical
exclusion from jury service based on religious principle.
This Article develops a proposed framework for a religious ex-
clusion from jury service. Part I provides the background regarding
why and how juries are impaneled. Part II describes the Anabaptist
worldview in which jury service is inherently inconsistent with relig-
ious principles. Part III argues for the constitutional guarantee of a
7. See, e.g., Tim Wyatt, Though Their Chances of Being Chosen Are Slim, Potential
Jurors Can Come Up With Creative Reasons to Dodge Their Duty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 10, 2000, at 16A; Allen Pusey, Excuses, Excuses: When Summoned, Some Claim
Illnesses, Prejudices Prevent Them From Serving, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2000,
at 22A.
8. 49 TEX.JUR. 3D Jury § 54; see alsoJudge Joe B. Brown, Jack Hebdon, & C.L.
Mike Schmidt, 4 TEX. PRAc. GUIDE PERSONAL INJURY 2D § 11:99; TEx Gov'T CODE
ANN. § 62.110 (Vernon 2005).
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religious exemption from jury service. Part IV draws from the con-
scientious objector provisions of military law, laying out proposed
criteria for a categorical exclusion of conscientious objectors to jury
service.
I.
AMERICAN JURIES: STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
Jury trials have been rooted in English legal tradition since at
least the time of the Magna Carta, and arrived in the American col-
onies with the Virginia Charter of 1606.9 Jury trials were widely
used in the colonies at the time of the founding, and the depriva-
tion of jury trials was cited in the Declaration of Independence as
an accusation against King George 111.10 Article III of the United
States Constitution and the Sixth Amendment both provide for ju-
ries in criminal trials, while the Seventh Amendment protects the
use of juries in certain civil cases (mostly the cases triable to a jury
at common law)." The Sixth Amendment requires the use of ju-
ries in state criminal courts. 12 There is no United States constitu-
tional guarantee of juries in state civil courts. 13 Nevertheless, most
state constitutions provide for jury trials in at least some civil
actions.14
In both state and federal courts, the jury selection process is
primarily concerned with the rights of litigants. In a civil case in
which there is a right to ajury trial, either party may demand ajury
by effectuating service of process on the other party and filing the
demand. 15 Choosing ajury over a bench trial is a significant deci-
sion involving a number of considerations such as cost, timing, and
whether ajudge or ajury would be more favorable given the type of
9. Kevin F. O'Malley, Jay E. Grenig, & Hon. William C. Lee, 1 FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 1.01 (5th ed. 2000) [hereinafter 1 FEDERAL JURY
PRACTICE].
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (criminal trials); U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(criminal trials); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (certain civil trials); 1 FEDERALJURY PRAC-
TICE, supra note 9, at §§ 1.01-1.02.
12. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968); see GEOFFREY C. HAZARD,
JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL CASES AND MATERIALS 995
(2005) [hereinafter PLEADING AND PROCEDURE].
13. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 157; see also PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, supra note
12, at 995.
14. Louisiana has no constitutional right to jury trials in civil cases, and the
constitutions of Colorado (Art. I, Sec. 23) and Wyoming (Art I, Sec. 9) have only
indirect provisions regarding civil jury trial. PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, supra note
12, at 998.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b); 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 1.03.
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suit, the law involved, and the facts to be alleged.' 6 If a jury trial is
demanded by either party, each party will attempt to manage the
jury selection process. The art, science, and industry of jury selec-
tion are well documented.1 7 Each party can challenge any number
of potential jurors on the basis of bias or prejudice, which then re-
quires the judge to consider the rationale of the challenge.18 The
bias or prejudice might not be party-specific, such as when a poten-
tial juror's opposition to the death penalty would prevent fair par-
ticipation in the jury. 19 The parties also get a limited number of
peremptory challenges that require no rationale at all. 20
The use of peremptory challenges is limited by the rights of
potential jurors in that no party may exercise a peremptory chal-
lenge solely on the basis of a potential juror's gender or race. 21 No
one has a right to serve on a jury, but everyone has the right not to
be excluded from a jury on account of gender or race. 22 The Su-
preme Court has not addressed whether peremptory strikes for
other reasons, such as disability or religion, violate a potential ju-
rors' constitutional rights.2 3 Before litigants or their attorneys are
afforded the opportunity to strike potential jurors, however, state
and federal systems create the jury pools from which the jury is
eventually chosen. Subpart A will detail the process of selectingju-
16. See, e.g., Nancy King et al., Mien Process Affects Punishment: Differences in
Sentences After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guideline States, 105
COLUM. L. R~v. 959, 968-91 (2005); PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at
1014.
17. See, e.g.,JOEL D. LIEBERMAN & BRUCE D. SALES, SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION
(2006); JEFFREY T. FREDERICK, MASTERING VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION: GAIN AN
EDGE IN QUESTIONING AND SELECTING YOURJURY (1st ed. 1995); DAVID BALL, T-IEA-
TER TIPS AND STRATEGIES FOR JURY TRIALS (2d ed. 1997).
18. PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1071; see Kirk v. Raymark In-
dus., 61 F.3d. 147 (3d Cir. 1995); cf Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
19. See, e.g., Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992); 1 FEDERALJURY PRACrICE,
supra note 9, at § 4.08.
20. In federal court, each party is entitled to three peremptory challenges. 28
U.S.C. § 1870. The number varies among states. In Texas, each party is entitled to
six in a civil suit. TEX. R. Civ. P. 233.
21. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (cannot exclude on the
basis of race);J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extended to gender); Ed-
monson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson to civil
cases); 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.09.
22. See Foti, supra note 1, at 1057-59.
23. While the Supreme Court has not addressed these issues, other courts
have. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870 (7th Cir. 1999) (peremptory
challenge based on disability does not violate equal protection); State v. Davis, 504
N.W.2d 767 (Minn. 1993) (refusing to extend Batson to peremptory strikes based
on religion).
Imaged with the Permission of NYU Annual Survey of American Law
20091
274 NYU ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW [Vol. 65:269
ries in state and federal courts; although state and federal jury selec-
tion differs in ways that will be noted, the processes are substantially
similar. Subpart B will outline current problems with the jury sys-
tem and the American Bar Association (ABA) recommendations
aimed to address those problems. Taken together, these Subparts
reveal the fact that no steps are currently being taken to address the
issue of religious exemption from jury service.
A. The Jury Selection Process
The particular details of selecting jury panels vary among states
but the general principles are largely consistent. Most states pro-
vide certain jury trial guarantees in their constitutions with statutory
provisions detailing the procedures to call and impanel the jury.24
The state statute determines how names of potential jurors are to
be collected 2 5 and the potential grounds for disqualifications, ex-
emptions, and excuses from service. 26 The relative roles ofjudges
and attorneys in the voir dire process vary, with judges dominating
the process in some states and lawyers dominating in others.27
However, the objective is the same in all states: ensuring that jurors
are impartial.28 The jury is ultimately comprised of those sum-
moned and not removed before or during voir dire.29
The Texas state system, in which the young Anabaptist man
described in the introduction was caught, will be detailed in this
Subpart as a representative example of most state jury systems.
First, the Texas right to ajury trial is a constitutional right provided
in two places: the Texas Bill of Rights and the Texas Judiciary Arti-
cle. 30 The guarantee of a right of trial by jury in the Bill of Rights
ensures the right to a jury in all actions for which that right existed
24. See TEX. CONST. art. I § 15; 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 4, 45-53 (2009); 73A N.
Y. JuR. 2D Jury § 3 (2009); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Juy § 10 (2000); see, e.g., TEX. Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 62.001-021 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
25. See 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 48-53 (2009); 73A N. Y. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 69-73
(2009); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Juy §§ 60-68 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
26. See 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 57-61 (2009); 73A N. Y. JUR. 2D Jury §§ 82-83
(2009); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 42-59 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
27. See Cortez ex rel. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d
87 (Tex. 2005).
28. See 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury § 4 (2009); 73A N. Y.JuR. 2D Jury § 66 (2009); 49
TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 86 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
29. See 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 81-84 (2009); 73A N. Y. JUR. 2D Jury § 84
(2009); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 124 (2000).
30. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10; 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 9
(2000 & Supp. 2008).
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at the time the Texas Constitution was adopted.3 1 The Judiciary
Article guarantees the right in the district courts to both plaintiffs
and defendants. 32 Unlike the Texas Bill of Rights guarantee, it
does not refer to jury rights predating the Texas Constitution.
Rather it covers all "causes," regardless of whether a jury was availa-
ble in 1876.3  However, the Judiciary Article is also narrower, in
that not all adversary proceedings are "causes" within the meaning
of the Judiciary Article.34 Thus, while not an absolute right, the jury
right in Texas is significantly broad and commonly invoked.3 5
The statutory process for calling a petit jury36 to serve in a civil
trial in a Texas district court37 is very similar to the process used in
other Texas courts3 8 and in criminal trials.39 All adult individuals
who meet certain statutory qualifications are considered competent
31. E.g, Bloch v. Dowell Schlumberger Inc., 925 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Tex. App.
1996); Casa El Sol-Acapulco, S.A. v. Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex. App.
1996); Holmans v. Transource Polymers, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 189, 192 (Tex. App.
1995); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 10.
32. TEX. CONST art. V, § 10.
33. 49 TEX.JUR. 3dJury § 11; see, e.g., Tolle v. Tolle, 101 104 S.W. 1049, 1050
(Tex. 1907); Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas v. State ex rel. Cobb, 133
S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App. 1939), afjd, 135 Tex. 25, 137 S.W.2d 993 (1940).
34. 49 TEX.JUR. 3D Jury § 11; see, e.g., Texas Workers' Comp. Coinm'n v. Gar-
cia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 527 (Tex. 1995).
35. 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 20; see, e.g., Schorp v. Baptist Mem'I Health Sys., 5
S.W.3d 727, 737-38 (Tex. App. 1999); Rent Am., Inc. v. Amarillo Nat'l Bank, 785
S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App. 1990); Buller v. Beaumont Bank, N.A., 777 S.W.2d 763,
764 (Tex. App. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 806 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. 1991); Olson v.
Texas Commerce Bank, 715 S.W.2d 764, 767 (Tex. App. 1986).
36. The "petit jury" is the body ultimately chosen to sit as factfinder at trial.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 874 (8th ed. 2004).
37. Though different in terms of other functions and processes, impaneling a
grand jury is quite similar to that of a petit jury in a civil trial. See discussion infra
note 39. The exemptions to grand jury service found in Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 19.25 essentially reflect the exemptions discussed below for petit
jury service. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 19.25 (Vernon 2005).
38. For example, there are six rather than twelve jurors in county courts and
justice courts. TEX CONST. art. V, §§ 17, 29; TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.301
(Vernon 2005); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 2.
39. Of course, criminal defendants have specific rights that civil parties do
not. However,jury panels for the trial of criminal cases generally must be selected
in the same manner as the selection of panels for the trial of civil cases. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 33.09 (Vernon 2005); 23 TEX. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3004.
In a prosecution for a capital case, one punishable by confinement for life or by
death, the defendant is entitled to request a special venire. 23 TEX. JUR. 3D Crimi-
nal Law § 3023; TEX. CODE CrM. PROC. ANN. art. 34.01 (Vernon 2005). A "special
venire" is a writ issued in a capital case by order of the district court commanding
the sheriff to summon either verbally or by mail such a number of persons, not less
than fifty, as the court may order, to appear before the court on a day named in
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jurors for civil trials in district courts, unless disqualified or ex-
empted by statute. 40 To be qualified, an adult Texan must be eligi-
ble to vote, of good moral character, able to read and write, not
have served as a juror too many days or too frequently, and free of
felony conviction and current indictment or other legal accusa-
tion. 41 Blind, deaf, and other physically impaired individuals usu-
ally must be accommodated by the court (e.g., by providing an
interpreter for the deaf) .42
A person is statutorily disqualified from serving and must be
excused from service if he or she is a witness in the case or has a
direct or indirect interest in the case. 43 Certain social and family
relationships with interested parties may disqualify a potential ju-
ror.4 4 A biased or prejudiced mindset that will prevent the person
from acting impartially as a juror will also disqualify the juror.45 A
disqualifying bias is not merely the type of bias directed towards
one party over another, but rather refers to biases against more
the writ from whom the jury for the trial of such case is to be selected. TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 34.01 (Vernon 2005).
40. TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.101 (Vernon 2005).
41. See id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000) (Americans With Disabilities Act); see also Saun-
ders v. State, 49 S.W.3d 536, 540 (Tex. App. 2001); see, e.g., Galloway v. Superior
Ct., 816 F.Supp. 12, 18 (D.D.C. 1993) (ADA prevents courts from automatically
excluding blind persons from juries); Michol O'Connor, O'CONNOR'S TEXAS
RULES 530 (2005) [hereinafter O'Connor's 2005].
43. TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.105; see also Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d
179, 182 (Tex. 1963); O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 530.
44. See, e.g., Galveston H. & S.A. Ry. v. Thornsberry, 17 S.W. 521, 522 (Tex.
1891) (employer-employee relationship between party and potential juror was dis-
qualifying); TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 62.103, 573.001-25 (Vernon 2005) (familial
relations of consanguinity or affinity within third degree between party and poten-
tial juror is a disqualifying relationship); O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 530;
cf Gant v. Dumas Glass & Mirror, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 202, 208-09 (Tex. App. 1996)
(prior lessor-lessee relationship and casual friendship between party and potential
juror were not disqualifying relationships).
45. TEX Gov'T CODE AN. § 62.105(4). The terms "bias" and "prejudice" sug-
gest a predisposition to favor one party over the other (bias) or one resolution of
an issue over another (prejudice). O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 530-31.
Bias and prejudice can be case-specific, but may also apply to a category of lawsuits,
such as opposing all personal injury lawsuits. See, e.g., Compton, 364 S.W.2d at 182
(Tex. 1963). One who conscientiously objects to jury service is not predisposed
towards one side of a dispute, but rather opposed to personal involvement in the
jury regardless of the parties, issues, or nature of suit. This opposition could be
described as a categorical bias or categorical prejudice. Regardless of its descrip-
tion, such opposition is similar to bias and prejudice insofar as it is a self-evident
disqualification from being an effective juror.
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general subjects, such as specific types of lawsuits46 or certain social
behaviors. 47
A person may be exempted from jury service if: the person is
over seventy years of age; the person has legal custody of a child
younger than ten years of age or is the primary caretaker of an inva-
lid and service would require leaving the child or invalid with inade-
quate supervision or assistance; the person is a student of a public
or private secondary school, or is enrolled and in actual attendance
at an institution of higher education; or the person is actively
deployed in the military service or currently employed in specific
governmental roles. 48 There are also exceptions for persons in
counties of a certain size under specific circumstances involving the
individual's recent service on a jury.49 A person entitled to an ex-
emption may choose whether to elect the exemption; if otherwise
willing, he or she cannot be excluded on the grounds of the
exemption.50
The jury impaneling process involves several steps, only one of
which is the identification of qualified jurors. First, the Secretary of
State compiles a list of prospective jurors for each county from lists
of licensed drivers and registered voters. 5' From these lists, the dis-
trict judge impanels prospective jurors. 52 Typically, when the po-
tential jurors are first gathered, they are read the list of statutory
disqualifications and exemptions and asked to identify themselves if
any apply.53 The potential jurors are also advised to identify them-
selves if they have an un-enumerated but reasonable excuse for not
serving on the jury so they may discuss their excuse with the judge
46. E.g., Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963) (personal in-
jury lawsuits).
47. E.g., Flowers v. Flowers, 397 S.W.2d 121, 123-24 (Tex. App. 1965) (drink-
ing alcohol).
48. TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 62.106(a)(1)-(5), (7), (9) (Vernon 2005).
49. Id. at §§ 62.106(a) (6), (8) (providing exemptions for service within two or
three years of the call date based on county jury plans, county size, and prior
service).
50. See, e.g., Randolph v. State, 36 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1931)
("Exempt jurors are not disqualified. They may waive their exemption.").
51. Id. §§ 62.001(a)-(g).
52. Id. §§ 62.016(a)-(h); TEX. R. Civ. P. 224; O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42,
at 531.
53. See, e.g., Michael J. McCormick, Thomas D. Blackwell, & Betty Blackwell,
7A TEXAS PRACTICE, Criminal Forms and Trial Manual § 67.22 (11th ed.). As a
practical matter, jurors have likely already been given the opportunity to identify
these issues in writing. 49 TEx. JUR. 3D Jury § 54.
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who is authorized to excuse or postpone their service. 54 Reasona-
ble excuses may include personal issues such as illness of children 55
or vacation plans. 56 Excuses predicated on mere personal econom-
ics (e.g., loss of compensation) are disfavored, as most jurors pre-
sumably suffer some economic cost in their service. 57 By statute,
jurors shall be excused if service conflicts with their observance of a
religious holy day.58 The jurors who remain following disqualifica-
tions and exemptions constitute the venire panel from which the
petit jury will ultimately be drawn.
After the prospective jury is impaneled, but before voir dire,
parties to the suit may challenge the process as it has actually oc-
curred or demand that the order in which the panelists are listed
be reshuffled. 59 The order is important because the first unchal-
lenged panelists on the list will sit on the jury.60 After any such
challenges, voir dire begins. Voir dire is the process by which par-
ties examine the venire panel members to determine if anyone is
disqualified "for cause" and to decide whether certain panelists
should be stricken through the use of peremptory challenges. 61 A
peremptory challenge permits parties to reject a panelist without
assigning a reason. 62 Such challenges are used by attorneys to
strike panelists whom the attorney deems disinclined to their cli-
ent's position, but who are not statutorily disqualified on grounds
such as bias or prejudice. 63 The judge oversees the parties' investi-
gation and exercises broad discretion in determining the propriety
of the questions. 64 Generally, however, the judge is to give the par-
54. 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 54; see also Brown, supra note 8, at § 11:99; TEX
Gov'T CODE ANN. §62.110 (Vernon 2005).
55. E.g., Barker v. Ash, 194 S.W. 465, 466-67 (Tex. App. 1917).
56. E.g., Ott v. State, 627 S.W.2d 218, 227-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
57. TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.110(c). Ajuror may not be excused for eco-
nomic reasons without the presence and approval of the parties of record. Id.; 49
TEX. JUR.3D Jury § 57.
58. TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. §62.112(b) (Vernon 2005); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury
§ 58.
59. TEX. R. Ctv. P. 221; O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 532; see also TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 62.001-021 (Vernon 2005) (describing the selection
process).
60. TEX. R. Crv. P. 223; O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 532; Michael M.
Gallagher, Abolishing the Texas Jury Shuffle, 35 ST. MARY'S LJ. 303, 311-12 (2004).
61. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARv 1605 (8th ed. 2004).
62. E.g., Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749-50 (Tex. 2006).
63. E.g., Implement Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Castleberry, 368 S.W.2d 249, 254
(Tex. App. 1963); O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 532.
64. E.g., Dickson v. Burlington N. R.R., 730 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. App. 1987);
O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 532.
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ties broad latitude in their investigations and, as a practical matter,
when in doubt, permit more questions than he or she prohibits. 65
The parties investigate each panel member through specific
questions either orally or by questionnaire. The questions are de-
signed to discover any bias or exemption from service. 66 In addi-
tion to statutory qualification and exemption issues, the presiding
judge is also invested with the discretion to opine whether a particu-
lar panelist is "an unfit person to sit on the jury."67 After the parties
have questioned the panel members with respect to these "for
cause" removal issues, the parties then proceed to peremptory
strikes of panel members for which no cause is necessary, as long as
the reason for the peremptory strike is constitutional. 68 Usually,
each side is entitled to six peremptory strikes.69 The first twelve
names on the list of remaining panel members who were not re-
moved for cause or by peremptory strike identify the individuals
comprising the jury to be called.7 0 Once called, the judge cannot
add or subtract jurors. 71
Before 1948, federal court practice for impaneling juries con-
formed to the state practice in which the court was located, which
meant there was no uniform federal practice. 72 Various reforms be-
ginning in 1948 and culminating in the Jury Selection and Service
Act of 196873 were intended to bring uniformity to the federal jury
system. 7 4 While the 1968 Act sets out uniform principles for jury
selection in federal courts, the implementation of those principles
65. Tex. Employers Ins. Ass'n v. Loesch, 538 S.W.2d 435, 440 (Tex. App.
1976); O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 532.
66. See, e.g., Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Tex. 1963); Imple-
ment, 368 S.W.2d at 254; Flowers v. Flowers, 397 S.W.2d. 121, 122-23 (Tex. App.
1965); O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 534.
67. TEx. R. Civ. P. 228; Burkett v. State, 196 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006) (stating that the trial court has discretion to remove a juror from service);
O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 535.
68. TEX. R. Crv. P. 232; Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 917
(Tex. 1979); O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 537.
69. TEX. R. Cn,. P. 233; Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W2d. 532, 533 (Tex. 1974);
O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 537.
70. See, e.g., O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 541.
71. E.g., Dunlap v. Excel Corp., 30 S.W.3d 427, 433 (Tex. App. 2000). So long
as at least nine of the original twelve jurors remain, the jury is able to render a
verdict, even if, for example, three of the jurors become physically or otherwise
disabled to serve. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; TEX. R. Crv. P. 292(a); TEX Gov'T CODE
ANN. § 62.201 (Vernon 2005) (parties agreeing to fewer than twelve jurors);
O'Connor's 2005, supra note 42, at 597.
72. 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 3.01.
73. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-74 (2006).
74. 1 FEDERAL JURY PRcrICE, supra note 9, at §§ 3.01-3.02.
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is reserved to the individual district court's local rules.75 The local
courts adopt a plan for the random selection of potential jurors,
though the local plan must be approved by the Judicial Council for
the circuit.76 The local plans are guided by the purposes of the
1968 Act: (a) that litigants entitled to trial by jury have the right to
juries selected at random from a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity in the district or division wherein the court convenes; (b) that
all citizens shall have the opportunity to be considered for service;
and (c) that all citizens shall have an obligation to serve as jurors
when summoned. 77
Although different federal courts adopt their own jury plans,
the plans are quite similar in substance. The following plan for the
Northern District of Texas is representative of federal plans with
respect to the topics relevant to this Article: service qualifications
and exemptions, and the process of impaneling jurors and con-
ducting voir dire.78
All adult individuals are considered competent jurors as long
as they fulfill the following qualifications: one must (1) be a United
States citizen who has resided for at least one year within the judi-
cial district; (2) be able to read, write, and understand English suffi-
ciently to fill out the jury qualification form; (3) be able to speak
English; (4) be mentally and physically able to serve; and (5) have
neither a pending charge nor a prior conviction for a crime punish-
able by more than one year in prison (unless his or her civil rights
have been restored). 79
Members of certain classes are barred from jury service in fed-
eral district court, which means they are not qualified to serve due
to categorical exemption: those in active military service, fire and
police force members, and governmental officers actively engaged
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(a) (2006); 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at
§ 3.03.
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1863(a)-(b); I FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at
§ 3.03.
77. See, e.g., Current Plan for the Selection of Grand and Petit Jurors in all
Divisions of the Northern District of Texas Adopted Pursuant to the jury Selection
and Service Act of 1968, Section 1861, et seq., Title 28, U.S.C. (1998) [hereinafter
N.D. Tex. Jury Plan], available at http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/pdf/MiscOrder5.
pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
78. Most federal districts have substantially similar plans. See, e.g., Plan for the
Random Selection of Jurors, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas,
available at http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/LocalRules/Documents/appe.
pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2009); United States District Court Eastern District of New
York, Jury Selection Plan (2006), available at http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/pub/
docs/juryplan.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
79. N.D. Tex. Jury Plan, supra note 77, at 8.
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in official duties.8 0 Members of the following classes are to be ex-
cused upon request: medical doctors; anyone caring for a child
younger than ten years of age or who is essential to the care of the
aged or infirm; persons over seventy years of age; and full-time
students. 8 1
In order to impanel jurors, the county clerk compiles a list of
prospective jurors for the court from the lists of licensed drivers
and registered voters in the district.82 This list is the master jury
wheel for the district, and the number of names drawn from each
county in the district must be proportional to the total number of
names in the master jury pool. 83 Various procedures are used to
ensure the names are randomly chosen for the master jury wheel.8 4
From the master jury wheel, a number of names are chosen based
upon anticipated jury need and a juror questionnaire form is
mailed to each individual chosen. 85 These questionnaire forms are
extensive, seeking information as to issues such as employment,
family situations, military service, litigation history, criminal history,
religious involvement, commonly read books or newspapers, favor-
ite movies and hobbies, gun ownership, social and political opin-
ions, and familiarity with the case or parties.86 These forms provide
the basis on which the court determines if the person is qualified,
exempted, or excused from jury service.8 7 Those remaining are put
on the "qualified jury wheel."8 8 When the court orders a jury to be
constituted, the clerk draws names randomly from the qualified
jury wheels and issues summonses for their appearance. 89 Those
summoned to appear constitute the panel unless the process of
constituting the panel is challenged. 90
When members of the panel appear in the courtroom, twelve
names are selected randomly. Those twelve are seated in the jury
box, while the others remain seated in the courtroom. 91 Unlike in
80. Id. at 8-9.
81. Id. at 9-10.
82. Id. at 4.
83. Id. at 4-5.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 6-7.
86. See, e.g., 1 FEDERALJURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at Chapter 4, Appendix B
(reprinting the sample juror questionnaire from the Northern District of
Georgia).
87. N.D. Tex. Jury Plan, supra note 77, at 7.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 11.
90. 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.07 (providing examples of
challenges that may be brought against potential jurors).
91. 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.10.
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some state courts, the examination of the panel in federal court is
subject to the wide discretion of the judge, who is authorized to
personally conduct the examination and to permit participation by
the attorneys as he or she deems appropriate. 92 As in the state
courts, the purpose of the voir dire examination is to determine if
any prospective jurors should be removed for favor or "for cause,"
though the distinction between the two is rarely observed,9 3 and to
give the attorneys sufficient information to exercise their peremp-
tory strikes.9 4 In civil cases, each side is usually entitled to three
peremptory strikes.9 5 With the tight control of the federal judge
over the process, the jury tends to be impaneled much more
quickly in federal courts than in state courts.96
B. ABA Principles for Juries
It has been said that the American jury trial is "dying. '9 7 Con-
tributing factors cited include the increasing use of alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms outside the court system, and, within
the court system, the increasing use by judges of summary disposi-
tions and procedural devices.9 8 Another likely factor is the in-
creased cost of litigation, including the high costs of jury
"consultants," the time involved, and parties' fears about juries be-
ing biased and incompetent as compared to judges.9 9 In almost all
states, between 1976 and 2002, the number of jury trials declined
92. FED. R. Crv. P. 47; 1 FEDERALJURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.07; PLEAD-
ING AND PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1071.
93. 1 FEDERALJURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.08. A challenge to the favor
is "[a] challenge for cause that arises when facts and circumstances tend to show
that a juror is biased but do not warrant the juror's automatic disqualification."
BLACK'S Law DICTIONARY 245 (8th ed. 2004).
94. 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.07.
95. 28 U.SC.A. § 1870 ("Several defendants or several plaintiffs may be con-
sidered as a single party for the purposes of making challenges, or the court may
allow additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised sepa-
rately or jointly."); 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE, supra note 9, at § 4.08.
96. PLEADING AND PROCEDURE, supra note 12, at 1070.
97. Chief Judge William G. Young, Address at the Spring Meeting of the
American College of Trial Lawyers (Mar. 6, 2004), as quoted in Neal Ellis, Saving
the Juy Trial, 34 A.B.A. BRIEF 14 (2005).
98. E.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explo-
sion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichs Eroding our Day in Court and Jury Tfial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 984, 1094 (2003); Ellis, supra note 97, at
15-17.
99. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL
L. REv. 119, 145-46 (2002); Ellis, supra note 97, at 15-20.
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significantly: civil jury trials decreased by 33% and criminal jury tri-
als decreased by 15%.00
In 2005, in response to these and other concerns about the
decline of the use of juries, the American Bar Association (ABA)
Principles for Juries and Jury Trials were adopted by the ABA
House of Delegates. 1° 1 These principles adopt a number of specific
measures aimed at ensuring a better deliberation process by juries
and more representative juries. In order to ensure better delibera-
tion, for example, new standards allow jurors to use written notes,
ask questions, and discuss evidence. 10 2 To ensure more representa-
tive juries, other measures force a broader spectrum of citizens to
serve. 10 3 The representative nature of juries has been compro-
mised by a number of factors. First, racial minorities have not his-
torically served on juries in proportion to their percentage of the
general population. 10 4 Second, an increasing and unjustifiable ex-
ploitation of exemptions and excuses results in a great number of
potential jurors actively avoiding jury service. 10 5 Many prospective
jurors who cannot claim a statutory exemption come armed with
excuses, which may range from a dislike of lawyers, to a dog with a
veterinarian appointment, to a vacation, or to an apparently self-
evident excuse of being a "soccer mom." 1 0 6 A related problem is
the number ofjurors who do not respond to the summons ordering
them to appear for service. In Texas, newspapers have recently re-
ported that only a quarter of those summoned to jury service in
Travis County actually appeared. 10 7 In Dallas County, only about
100. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, IJ. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 506-15 (2004);
see also Brian J. Ostrom et al., Examining Tial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 755, 756 (2004); Ellis, supra note 97, at 15.
101. Ellis, supra note 97, at 20.
102. ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS (2005) §§ 13(A), (C), (F)
[hereinafter ABA PRINCIPLES]; Ellis, supra note 97, at 20-22.
103. ABA PRINCIPLES § 10(C); Ellis, supra note 97, at 22.
104. Ellis, supra note 97, at 22.
105. ABA PRINCIPLES 10(C); Ellis, supra note 97, at 22.
106. SeeJane Greig, Many Are Called; Some Are Chosen; Few Are ExcusedfromJury
Duty, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, Mar. 16, 2002, at D1, available at 2002 WL 4817942;
see also Tim Wyatt, Though Their Chances of Being Chosen Are Slim, Potential Jurors Can
Come Up With Creative Reasons to Dodge Their Duty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 10,
2000, at 16A; Pusey, supra note 7, at 22A; KB. Battaglini, Mark A. Behrens, & Cary
Silverman, Essay, Jury Patriotism: The Jury System Should Be Improved For Texans Called
To Serve, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 117, 119 (2003).
107. E.g., Jason Spencer, Looking for a Way to Boost Juror Pay, AUSTIN AM.
STATESMAN, Dec. 27, 2002, at Al. According to the Travis County District Clerk
and auditor, twenty-seven percent of those summoned appear for jury service,
thirty-four percent are excused from service before appearing in court, twenty-
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twenty percent responded to a notice to appear for jury duty. 10 8 In
El Paso, jury summons response was so low that a murder trial had
to be delayed.109 Thus, one general jury reform objective is to com-
pel a greater degree of service from the population, limiting the use
of exemptions and excuses. 110
However, restricting the use of juror exemptions and excuses
cannot become the overriding principle in jury management as it
must be balanced with other factors such as the constitutional
rights of both litigants and potential jurors. Currently codified ex-
emptions based on age, employment, or personal obligations, such
as being a student or caregiver raise few, if any, constitutional is-
sues. Routinely recognized excuses, such as the inconvenience of
re-scheduling a vacation, involve even fewer salient legal concerns.
In contrast, the concept of a religious exemption raises numerous
constitutional issues. While the current scheme accommodates po-
tential jurors whose service would conflict with religious obligations
on certain days, it does not cover those jurors for whom service it-
self would conflict with their religious obligations every day.111
II.
ANABAPTIST WORLDVIEW AND CONSCIENTIOUS
OBJECTION TO JURY SERVICE
It is important to understand the worldview of the young Ana-
baptist discussed above who objected to jury service. While a relig-
ious objection to jury service likely seems curious to many
Americans, his objection was essential to his religious worldview. In
his mind, he could not be both a Christian and a juror, This Part
outlines the religious beliefs of traditional Anabaptists to elucidate
eight percent of summonses are returned as undeliverable, and eleven percent of
those summoned ignore the summons completely. Id.; see also Battaglini, supra
note 106, at 119.
108. Dallas County officials mailed 13,027 summonses for jury service on civil
and criminal trials to begin on March 6, 2000. Ted M. Eades, Revisiting the Jury
System in Texas: A Study of the Jury Pool in Dallas County, 54 SMU L. REv. 1813, 1814
(2001). An additional 585 people were expected to appear forjury service because
they had answered summonses for an earlier court date but had asked to
reschedule to that date. Id. Of the 13,612 expected to appear for jury duty, only
2,214 showed up in court. Id.; see also Battaglini, supra note 106, at 119.
109. SeeJennifer Shubinski, Juror No-Shows Delay Murder Trial, EL PASO TIMES,
May 15, 2002, at 3 (reporting that out of 120 potential jurors summoned to the
41st District Court, twenty-three did not appear in court and eight others were
excused from jury service). Battaglini, supra note 106, at 119.
110. See Richard K. Willard, What is Wrong with American Juries and How to Fix
It, 20 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'y 483, 484-85, 487 (1997); Ellis, supra note 97, at 22.
111. See TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.112(b); 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Juiy § 58.
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the religious objection to jury service, which may then be defended
as a constitutionally mandated free exercise of religion.
A. Anabaptists in America: Familiar and Foreign
The term "Anabaptist" in modern usage covers four related but
distinct Christian sects: Hutterites, Mennonites, Amish, and the
Brethren. 1 2 Of the four, the Amish are probably the most familiar:
bearded buggy-driving Pennsylvania farmers without electrical ser-
vice. 113 But, perhaps, this image of Anabaptism has now been re-
placed in the popular imagination by the response of the Amish
community to the Nickel Mines School tragedy in which a gunman
shot ten Amish schoolgirls before killing himself.1 14 Many were in-
spired by the Amish reaction broadcasted worldwide by the me-
dia. 1 5 Amish parents of victims went to the killer's funeral, hugged
his family, and shared with them the money donated to the Amish
in response to the tragedy. 1 6 Onejournalist described the reaction
112. DONALD B. KRAYBILL & C. NELSON HOSTETrER, ANABAPTIST WORLD USA
12 (2001). This categorization reflects mostly historical development. Some sects
with similar theologies are also occasionally labeled as "Anabaptist," even though
there is no historical continuity with the radical Swiss Brethren of the Protestant
Reformation. For example, the Bruderhof Communities began in 1920 and have
no historical connection with the Anabaptists but, due to theological and social
connections, often are categorized as Hutterites. For similar reasons, the Apostolic
Christian Church of America (sometimes called "the New Amish") are often cate-
gorized as Mennonite. Id. at 157-58. Population-wise, the Anabaptist world is
twenty-two percent Amish, thirty-four percent Brethren, two percent Hutterite,
and forty-two percent Mennonite. Id. at 33. Despite the common name, today's
Brethren have the least historical connections with the radical Swiss Brethren of
the Protestant Reformation. The Hutterites represent one independent develop-
ment, while the Amish are a more conservative limb of the Mennonite branch. Id.
at 24-29.
113. See generally, e.g., DONALD B. KRAYBILL & CARL F. BOWMAN, ON THE
BACKROAD TO HEAVEN: OLD ORDER HUTrERITES, MENNONITES, AMISH AND BRETH-
REN (2001); THE AMISH AND THE STATE (Donald B. Kraybill ed., 2d ed. 2003); DON-
ALD B. KRAYBILL, THE RIDDLE OF AMISH CULTURE (2001) (giving extensive analysis
to the ways Old Order Amish and other Anabaptists have affected the American
culture and legal system).
114. David Kocieniewski & Gary Gately, Man Shoots 11, Killing 5 Girls, in Amish
School, N.Y. TIMES, October 3, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/10/03/us/03amish.html.
115. Coverage commemorating the one-year anniversary of the tragedy aired
was extensive. See, e.g., Ann Rodgers, Nickel Mines Legacy: Forgive First, PITTSBURG
POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 30, 2007, at Al, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/
07273/821700-85.stm.
116. Joseph Shapiro, Amish Forgive School Shooter, Struggle With Grief, NPR, Oct.
12, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=14900930. One
of the fathers of a slain girl believed "the pain of the killer's father must be 10
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in this way: "[t]his is imitation of Christ at its most naked .... If
anybody is going to turn the other cheek in our society, it's going to
be the Amish .... I don't want to denigrate anybody else who says
they're imitating Christ, but the Amish walk the walk as much as
they talk the talk."'' 17
While the Amish are only one of the Anabaptist sects, their
strongly countercultural attempts to live the teaching of Jesus em-
body the essence of Anabaptism. It is in this countercultural religi-
osity that these generally law-abiding citizens ground their
fundamental opposition to jury duty. 118 Therefore, to understand
the Anabaptist objection, one must understand the radical faith of
the Anabaptists.
B. European Persecution of Early Anabaptists
"Anabaptist" (meaning "re-baptizer") was the epithet applied
to the radical Swiss reformers who merely called themselves the
"Brethren" during the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation.' 1 9
These Brethren wanted to radically reconstruct the church entirely
upon a New Testament pattern (rather than merely "reform" it,
times greater than mine." Donald B. Kraybill, Lessons in Compassion and Empathy,
PHIL. INQUIRER, Sept. 30, 2007, available at http://www.philly.com/inquirer/cur-
rents/O137632.html. It was not merely sympathy for the killer's family but for-
giveness for the killer that the public witnessed. One of the mothers of a slain girl
said, "I am overcome with sadness that Roberts' life ended without the opportunity
for repentance." Id. Another Amish man stated: "I can't say anything about Rob-
erts in eternity. Only God knows. I wish [Roberts] the same as I wish for myself."
Id.
117. Laurie Goodstein, Strong Faith and Community May Help Amish Cope With
Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2006, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
1O/04/us/O4amish.html (quoting Tom Shachtman, author of RUMSPRINGA: To BE
OR NOT TO BE AMISH (2006)). Perhaps even more foreign to many than this level
of forgiveness was the Amish reaction when they realized their forgiveness had
been publicized. They did not want publicity for doing what they believed Jesus
taught. They wanted others to focus on God and to understand that forgiveness is
a journey along which God, community, and professional counselors are playing
roles to help the victims' families "hold on to a decision to not become a hostage
to hostility." Herman Bontrager, Nickel Mines Tragedy Update, MENNONITE CENT.
COMMITTEE NEWS, Sept. 24, 2007, http://www.mcc.org/news/news/article.html?id
=252.
118. For an overview of ways in which conservative Anabaptists have at-
tempted to comply with both their faith and the laws, see THE AMISH AND THE
STATE, supra note 113.
119. THoMAs G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE: HIS-
TORICAL BACKGROUNDS AND APPROACHES FOR THE FUrTURE 77 (1964).
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which is what the more conservative Protestants sought).120 They
were convinced infant baptism was outside the New Testament pat-
tern, so adult water baptism became one of their distinctions.' 2 1
Though the nature of baptism was but one of many distinctive Ana-
baptist beliefs, it was, for the state authorities, the one that merited
the swiftest persecution because it defied state control of the
church. 122 It was the foundation for an independent church (i.e.,
one free of state control). 123
Infant water baptism, at that time, conferred not only member-
ship in the church but civil citizenship, and, along with that citizen-
ship, it granted the civil authorities the right to tax and
conscript. 124 Considered treason because it threatened the union
of church and state, adult water baptism was a capital offense in
sixteenth-century Europe. 125  Consequently, Anabaptists were
hunted, imprisoned, and tortured.1 26 They were burned, drowned,
and beheaded. 127 More than 5000 were killed during the first ten
120. WILLIAM R. EsTEP, THE ANABAPTIST STORY- AN INTRODUCTION TO SIX-
TEENTH CENTURY ANABAPTISm 241-43 (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ'g Co. 1996) (1963).
The Swiss Brethren rejected what they considered to be the slow pace and compro-
mising flexibility of Martin Luther, Ulrich Zwingli, and other more conservative
reformers. The tension over the slow pace of reform is evidenced in the disputa-
tion between Conrad Grebel (a radical) and Ulrich Zwingli in October 1523. In
the October disputation, Zwingli, Grebel, and others argued as to various church
practices. Zwingli agreed with the radicals that the scriptures should be the stan-
dard for Christian faith and practice. However, Zwingli distinguished between
truth as determined from the scriptures and truth as implemented by the Zurich
council to which he submitted. In the eyes of the radicals, Zwingli compromised
truth to politics, and their reaction began the "free church" movement to separate
church and state. Id. at 15-18.
121. See, e.g., id. at 206-07. The earliest statement of Anabaptist beliefs is
found in the 1527 Schleitheim Confession. Schleithem Confession, in GLOBAL ANA-
BAPTIST MENNONITE ENCYCLOPEDIA ONLINE, http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/
encyclopedia/contents/S345.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
122. KRAYBILL & BowMAN, supra note 113, at 1-2.
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. at 1.
125. Id. at 1-2. This was equally true in Roman Catholic and Protestant coun-
tries. ESTEP, supra note 120, at 29. Felix Manz was the first of the Brethren to be
executed for re-baptizing. Id. at 47. However, the first Anabaptist to be executed
was Eberli Bolt who died at the stake in 1525. His crime was not adult baptism, but
rather being a Protestant in a Roman Catholic canton. Paul Schowalter, Martyrs, in
Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online, http://www.gameo.org/ency-
clopedia/contents/M37857.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
126. KRAYBILL & BoWAiAN, supra note 113, at 2.
127. Id.
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years of the persecution.1 28 The Anabaptists suffered persecution
in both Roman Catholic and Protestant countries. 129
C. Traditional Anabaptist Doctrines
Traditionally, Anabaptists have oriented their religious world
view around the "Sermon on the Mount," which are the teachings
ofJesus described in Matthew 5:1-7 and Luke 6:17-49.130 The Ser-
mon emphasizes, for example, the importance of meekness, 131
mercy, 132 peace-making, 133 love of enemies,' 34 forgiveness,1 35 and
the refusal to judge others. 13 6 In the Anabaptist worldview, these
teachings of Jesus are summed by love and non-resistance (i.e., re-
fusing to defend one's self physically or otherwise, including in law-
suits). 1 3 7  The Sermon on the Mount is the interpretative
128. PERRY BUSH, Two KINGDOMS, Two LOYALTIES 20 (John Hopkins Univ.
Press 1998); Paul Schowalter, Martyrs, in Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclope-
dia Online, http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/M37857.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 11, 2009). Finding the use of individual trials and sentences inadequate,
the authorities sent out armed executioners and mounted soldiers to execute
Anabaptists on the spot singly or en masse. EsTEP, supra note 120, at 74; Harold S.
Bender, The Anabaptist Vision, 13 CHURCH HIST. 3, 6 (1944).
129. EsTEP, supra note 120, at 74-75; Bender, supra note 128, at 5.
130. The term "Sermon on the Mount" was first used by Augustine around
400 A.D. HARVEY K. McARTHUR, UNDERSTANDING THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT 11
(1960). Gandhi considered the impact of the Sermon on him to be second only to
the Bhagavad Gita. See generally SwAMi PRAHBHAVANADA, THE SERMON ON T14E
MOUNT ACCORDING TO VEDANTA (1963) (providing a Hindu interpretation of the
Sermon on the Mount). Many (including some Christians) have argued that the
Sermon on the Mount is essentially Jewish rather than exclusively Christian. Mc-
ARTHUR, supra, at 49-54.
131. Matthew 5:5.
132. Id. at 5:7.
133. Id. at 5:9.
134. Id. at 5:43.
135. Id. at 6:14.
136. Id. at 7:1. The Sermon on the Mount is "often seen as pointing to the
essence of the Anabaptist understanding of the Christian way, especially in contrast
to mainstream Protestantism with its roots in the Lutheran and Calvinist reforma-
tions. Whereas Luther emphasized salvation by faith and grace alone, the Anabap-
tists placed emphasis on the obedience of faith." Abe J. Dueck, Sermon on the
Mount, in GLOBAL ANABAPTIST MENNONITE ENCYCLOPEDIA ONLINE, http://www.
gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/S475ME.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
137. See, e.g., LEO DRIEDGER & DONALD B. KRAYBILL, MENNONITE PEACEMAKING:
FROM QUIETISM TO ACTqvsM 21-23, 22-29, 50-52 (1994). ESTEP, supra note 120, at
126, 193-96. George R. Brunk, III, New Testament, Global Anabaptist Mennonite
Encyclopedia Online (1989), http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/
N498ME.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2009); DRIEDGER & KRAYBILL, supra, at 22-29.
But see Dueck, supra note 136.
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touchstone for the Anabaptists. 138 Traditionally, the Anabaptists
have considered the teachings of Jesus, especially the Sermon on
the Mount, to be literally and absolutely binding on all
Christians.1 39
Perhaps surprisingly to some, the appropriate role of the Ser-
mon on the Mount and other teachings of Jesus in Christianity is a
contentious theological matter. The early Anabaptists insisted the
teachings were obligatory for all Christians. 140 Other Christians
have tended to reject this. Roman Catholic theologians have gener-
ally argued that these teachings were good spiritual advice ("coun-
sels"), especially for clergy, but not binding rules for "salvation."'141
Furthermore, Lutheran, Calvinist, and most other Protestant theo-
logians have generally rejected the necessity (and even possibility or
desirability) of Christians following the teachings, insisting instead,
for example, that the primary purpose of the teachings is to illus-
trate human guilt by introducing standards to which no human can
adhere. 142 Thus, the early Anabaptist position regarding the teach-
ings of Jesus is anomalous among Christian theologies. Indeed,
other Christians have been very critical of this Anabaptist position,
arguing that this interpretation is legalistic and, thus not properly
"Christian."143
For the early Anabaptists, the church was comprised of those
adults who voluntarily committed to following the teachings of
Jesus, understood as living a life of love and non-resistance.144 In
his teachings, Jesus warned those who followed his way that they
would endure persecution and suffering.1 45 Anabaptists opposed
infant baptism into church membership because children could
not make a free choice to suffer as a disciple. 146 The Anabaptist
church was to be comprised of those willing to live a life of love and
138. E.g., Dueck, supra note 136.
139. ESTEP, supra note 120, at 126, 193-96; Brunk, supra note 137; William
Klassen, Old Testament, Global Anabaptist Mennonite Encyclopedia Online (1959),
available at http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/O548.html (last visited
Mar. 12, 2009).
140. This "absolutist" view has been held by others, of course, such as Leo
Tolstoy. MCARTHUR, supra note 130, at 106-07.
141. Id. at 114-17.
142. See id. at 117-22, 125-26.
143. Dueck, supra note 136.
144. Correspondence with Professor Jeffrey A. Bach, Director, Young Center
for Anabaptist and Pietist Studies, Elizabethtown College, Elizabethtown, Penn-
sylvania (on file with author) (Apr. 27, 2009) [hereinafter Bach Correspondence];
ESTEP, supra note 120, at 238.
145. See, e.g., Mark 8:34; Matthew 5:10-11.
146. Bach Correspondence, supra note 144; Bender, supra note 128, at 18.
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non-resistance-and suffer the consequences, as Jesus did. 147 The
Anabaptist doctrine of "non-conformity" described the ways in
which those committed to a life of love and non-resistance would
differ in daily life from "the world" around them.148 Thus, in the
traditional Anabaptist view, Christians conformed to the lifestyle of
Jesus (i.e., love and non-resistance) and refused to conform to the
lifestyles of others.' 49 Adult water baptism symbolized the willing-
ness to accept this non-conformity as a condition of membership in
the church.' 50
Part of the historical Anabaptist non-conformity was the rejec-
tion of a religious state; that is, they rejected the union of church
and state.' 5' In their view, the state was in inherent conflict with
the church, which meant that the church and Christians should ex-
pect to suffer for their refusal to give into state demands and should
do so in a non-resistant manner.15 2 They believed that the role of
the state could never be reconciled with the Sermon on the
Mount.' 53
Historically, this rejection of a state-church ideal put Anabap-
tists at odds with both Roman Catholics and Protestants. 54 The
historical Roman Catholic and Calvinist position was that church
and state could be united into one, that the secular order could be
"Christianized.'1 55 Luther was more pessimistic about the relation-
ship between church and state.156 Lutheran theology accepted the
inevitable conflict between state demands and religious life but in-
sisted that Christians submit to secular authority (e.g., to serve in
war) even if it was inconsistent with Christian principles (e.g., to
147. Bach Correspondence, supra note 144; ESTEP, supra note 120, at 42, 238,
264.
148. See Schleitheim Confession, art. IV, VI, in GLOBAL ANABAPTIST MENNONITE
ENCYCLOPEDIA ONLINE, http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/con-
tents/S345.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
149. Bach Correspondence, supra note 144; Bender, supra note 128, at 18-19;
ESTEP, supra note 120, at 211, 257-58.
150. Bach Correspondence, supra note 144; ESTEP, supra note 120, at 89, 211.
151. Bach Correspondence, supra note 144. The rejection of the Old Testa-
ment as authoritative for Christians' lives includes a rejection of the union of
church and state. The Old Testament descriptions of a religious nation were su-
perseded by the New Testament descriptions of an obedient church. ESTEP, supra
note 120, at 126, 193-96; Brunk, supra note 137; Klassen, supra note 139.
152. BUSH, supra note 128, at 6-7; Bender, supra note 128, at 18.
153. Bach Correspondence, supra note 144; EsrEP, supra note 120, at 126,
193-96; Brunk, supra note 137; Klassen, supra note 139.
154. ESTEP, supra note 120, at 29, 47.
155. BUSH, supra note 128, at 6-7; Bender, supra note 128, at 23.
156. Bender, supra note 128, at 23; see BUSH, supra note 128, at 6-7.
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love enemies). 157 In classical Lutheran theology, compromise in
the sinful world was considered necessary. 158 The Anabaptists re-
jected both the Roman Catholic and Calvinist idea that the secular
world could be Christianized, as well as the Lutheran call to
compromise.159
Thus, the traditional Anabaptist understanding of church-state
relations was dualistic. God had ordained two kingdoms on
earth. 160 One kingdom was the secular world ruled by human gov-
ernment.161 God permitted this government to resist evil and even
use violence in order to maintain order in a sinful world. 162 The
second kingdom was the church comprised of those individuals
who renounced resistance to evil, violence, and conformity to the
secular world as part of their commitment to follow Jesus.1 63 As
members of the church, Christians were precluded from participat-
ing in the secular government's kingdom. 164
D. American Anabaptists: Persecution, Assimilation, and Diversity
The history of the Anabaptists is rooted in European persecu-
tion, and traditional Anabaptist theology is rooted in non-resistance
and non-conformity. However, almost 500 years of history, most of
it in the United States, has also had an impact on the Anabaptists.
While some contemporary American Anabaptists continue to em-
phasize a traditional understanding of non-resistance and non-con-
formity, most Anabaptists have been assimilated into the broader
American culture.1 65 As a result, not all contemporary Anabaptists
157. Bender, supra note 128, at 23; see BUSH, supra note 128, at 6-7.
158. BUSH, supra note 128, at 6-7; Bender, supra note 128, at 23.
159. BUSH, supra note 128, at 6-7; Bender, supra note 128, at 23.





165. Sociologists have categorized contemporary American Anabaptists ac-
cording to the degree of cultural assimilation. The most assimilated groups (la-
beled the "Transformational Groups") support higher secular education, have
professional pastors, widely use technology, accept religious individualism, partici-
pate in mainstream cultural activities, as well as local, state, and national politics.
The least assimilated groups (labeled the "Traditional Groups") reject these main-
stream practices, but also separate themselves further from the mainstream culture
by speaking German rather than English (at least among themselves), wearing
plain clothing, emphasizing the authority of the church over the individual, avoid-
ing many types of contemporary technology, using horse-drawn transportation,
and adhering to the "Old Order" traditional ways and understandings. The mid-
dle groups (labeled the "Transitional Groups") differ from the Traditional Groups
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object to being involved in government activities, though the more
"conservative" ones still do. 166
Anabaptist migration to America began as early as 1644.167 For
the most part, their religiously-inspired non-conformity has been
protected in the United States. For example, they have been
granted exemptions from compulsory education, occupational reg-
ulations, and even Social Security taxation in certain situations. 168
Yet the Anabaptist experience in the United States has not been
entirely peaceful, especially during war time when their non-resis-
tance has brought them both official and unofficial persecution.
This was especially acute during World War I, when non-resistant
Anabaptists were beaten, tarred and feathered, had church build-
ings burned to the ground, and their church services disrupted
while "patriots" hung flags inside the buildings.1 69 In an instance of
in using English, motorized vehicles, and more contemporary technology, gener-
ally, but continue to wear plain clothing, use non-professional pastors, discourage
higher education, and forbid divorce and the ordination of women. About sixty-
seven percent of Anabaptists belong to Transformational Groups; twenty percent
to Traditional Groups; and thirteen percent to Transitional Groups. KRAYBILL &
HOSTETTER, supra note 112, at 56, 58. References to "assimilated Anabaptists" are
references to those in these Transformational Groups. The largest Transforma-
tional Groups are the Church of the Brethren, Fellowship of Grace Brethren
Churches, and the Mennonite Church. Id. at 144-46.
166. The assimilated Anabaptists have engaged in lobbying and protest move-
ments directed towards government policy. See BUSH, supra note 128, at 66-67,
119. For example, the "Mennonite Church USA," which is the largest Mennonite
body has a standing peace and social justice committee that has advocacy programs
related to immigration, Native Americans, the war in Iraq, and the Israeli-Palestin-
ian conflict. See http://peace.mennolink.org/advocacy.html (last visited January
28, 2009).
167. The year 1644 is the earliest reference to Mennonites in North America.
These Mennonites were in Manhattan. A settlement was established on the Dela-
ware River in 1663 but was destroyed a year later by British troops. The oldest
settlement of Mennonites in America is Germantown, Pennsylvania, which was set-
tled in 1683 by a group comprised of Mennonites and (German-speaking)Quakers. CORNELIUS J. DYCK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MENNONITE HISTORY 195-96
(1993).
168. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972) (exemption from
compulsory education). See generally Thomas J. Meyers, Chapter Five: Education and
Schooling, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE, supra note 113, at 87; PeterJ. Ferrara,
Chapter Seven: Social Security and Taxes, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE, supra note
113, at 125; LeeJ. Zook, Chapter Eight: Slow-Moving Vehicles, in THE AMISH AND THE
STATE, supra note 113, at 145; Gertrude Enders Huntington, Chapter Nine: Health
Care, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE, supra note 113, at 163.
169. BUSH, supra note 128, at 28; see also DYCK, supra note 167, at 412.
Anabaptists were suspected as being traitors during both the American Revolution
and the Civil War. During the American Revolution, many Anabaptists were ac-
cused of being Tories. During the Civil War, opposition to slavery by Anabaptists
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official persecution, United States Marshalls raided a publishing
house, seizing gospel tracts considered to be disloyal. 170 As consci-
entious objectors drafted into the military, some Anabaptists were
beaten with fists and hoses, forced to stand for hours in the sun,
threatened with execution, reduced to bread and water diets, and
imprisoned. 71 Forty-five Anabaptists were sentenced to life in
prison at hard labor for refusing an officer's orders to wear the mili-
tary uniform. 1 72
Despite the periodic persecution, the dominant experience of
American Anabaptists during the twentieth century was moderniza-
tion, urbanization, and higher education. The result has been cul-
tural assimilation of most Anabaptists, as well as substantial
reinterpretation of Anabaptist theology. The assimilated Anabap-
tists have blunted the sharp duality between the kingdoms of
church and state, now insisting that Christians have some responsi-
bilities in the secular world. They have largely rejected non-con-
formity, at least to the extent it means withdrawal from dealing with
the world's problems.1 7 3 Believing that following Jesus required
not only passive non-resistance but also active peace-making and
confrontation with authorities, they began not only voting and lob-
bying the government but also engaging in social justice and anti-
war protests. 17 4 Thus, among the more assimilated Anabaptists, re-
jection of participation in government affairs is no longer consid-
ered essential. 175
Unlike the assimilated Anabaptists, the more conservative
Anabaptists continue with a sharply dualistic two-kingdom theol-
in the South made them look like Unionists. Id. at 410-12. During World War II,
Anabaptist conscientious objectors in the military were treated better than they
were in World War I, though civilians continued to harass Anabaptists for a lack of
patriotism by beating them, firing them from their jobs, vandalizing their homes
and church buildings, hanging them in effigy, and, on one occasion, planting a
pipe-bomb. BUSH, supra note 128, at 90-120.
170. DRIEDGER & KRAYBILL, supra note 137, at 65.
171. BusH, supra note 128, at 28.
172. They were released after the war. Id.
173. BUSH, supra note 128, at 62-67, 119.
174. Id.
175. The assimilated Anabaptists have engaged in lobbying and protest move-
ments directed towards government policy. Id. For example, the "Mennonite
Church USA," which is the largest Mennonite body has a standing peace and social
justice committee that has advocacy programs related to immigration, Native
Americans, the war in Iraq, and Israel-Palestine. See http://peace.mennolink.org/
advocacy.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).
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ogy. 17 6 They insist that Christians should not expect the secular
government to operate by non-resistance, love, humility, and a will-
ingness to suffer, 177 and that the Sermon on the Mount is not legis-
lation for the state but inspiration for the church.1 78  To
conservatives, the matters of government are, simply put, none of
their business. 179 Their social focus is to withdraw from the world
through non-conformity and to create church-communities as ex-
amples of the Kingdom of God with the hope that the light of their
example draws others into discipleship.' 80
Among conservative Anabaptists who adhere to the historical
understandings of the relationship of church and state, the judicial
system itself is considered "contrary to the life, teaching and walk of
our Lord Jesus."'' Conservative Anabaptists are expected to em-
brace non-resistance in daily living by, for example, refusing to file
law suits. 182 This prohibition also extends to pressing charges for
theft and, of course, serving on the police force. In their under-
standing, Christians ought not to be involved in using the force of
the government.1 83 To be involved with the secular government
would be to choose the way of the world over the way of the cross.
To be punished for refusing participation is an expected part of the
choice, not a reason to avoid it.18 4 To avoid the way of the cross
176. References to "conservative Anabaptists" are references to that one-third
of American Anabaptists who belong to Traditional Groups and Transitional
Groups. See supra note 165. The largest Traditional and Transitional Groups in-
clude the Old Order Amish, the Old German Baptist Brethren, the Schmiedeleut
Hutterites, the Church of God in Christ Mennonite, the Eastern Pennsylvania
Mennonite Church, the Nationwide Mennonite Fellowship Churches, and the Old
Order Mennonite Groffdale Conference. KRAYBILL & HOSTETTER, supra note 112,
at 144-46.




181. DRIEDGER & KRAYBILL, supra note 137, at 33 (quoting letter from six Lan-
caster County Mennonite leaders to Henry Neiss (Aug. 29, 1847), reprinted in 22
MENNONITE HIST. BULL., Apr. 1967, at 7,7).
182. DRIEDGER & KRAYBILL, supra note 137, at 50.
183. See, e.g., Paul Horst, Nonresistance and Nonparticipation in Civil Government
(Tract No. 21E74), available at http://www.anabaptists.org/tracts.html#rastracts
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009);Joseph Keener, Separation of Church and State (Tract No.
31E30), available at http://www.anabaptists.org/ras/31e30.html (last visited Mar.
11, 2009).
184. As explained above, see supra note 137, Anabaptists have emphasized
Jesus' teachings, such as the command to "take up your cross and follow me."
Mark 8:34. This obligation to suffer for doing God's will is known as the "way of
the cross," (or the model of the "suffering servant") and is described as the "Gos-
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and choose conformity to the world instead could be grounds for
excommunication.185
Historically, jury service has been seen as the way of the world.
The American Anabaptist prohibition of jury service was first re-
corded in a written church discipline by 1809.186 That was the year
in which it appears as Article 8 of the Pennsylvania Amish-Mennon-
ite discipline: "concerning jury service, it is decided that it shall not
be tolerated or permitted for brethren of the church."'a8 7 The 1809
discipline was the first Amish-Mennonite discipline written in the
United States. 188 It was drafted by ordained ministers who met to-
gether to memorialize rules and regulations for their congrega-
tion.189 They considered the discipline to be the application of
scriptural principles to the problems of the times. 190 The fact that
the prohibition was recorded in 1809 does not mean that it was
new, but rather that it was of such settled meaning that it deserved
to be stated alongside such other well-settled principles as "worldly
dress shall not be tolerated."191
A contemporary articulation of the prohibition on jury service
was stated by the conservative Southeastern Mennonite Conference
pel" by late Mennonite theologian John Howard Yoder. Yoder claims a commit-
ment to this suffering is the essence of being a Christian for Anabaptists. James
Reimer, Mennonites, Christ, and Culture: The Yoder Legacy, 16 THE CONRAD GREBEI
REVIEW 2, 7-8 (Spring 1998). More generally in Christian theology, for a Christian
to suffer for one's faithful conviction is "a way to participate in Christ's redemptive
process by which God's kingdom comes to birth in our midst." Sandra Cronk,
Comments on the Atonement, 21 QUAKER RELIGIOUS THOUGHT 4, 39 (Spring 1986).
185. One of the distinctions between conservative Anabaptists and assimilated
Anabaptists is that the former continue to regularly excommunicate church mem-
bers whereas excommunication is mostly unknown today among assimilated
Anabaptists. Violating the "standards" of the church is grounds for excommunica-
tion. KRAYBIL & HOSTETTER, supra note 112, at 47, 60. For a discussion of the
importance of excommunication in historical Anabaptist thought and practice, see,
e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, No Discipline, No Church: An Anabaptist Contribution to the
Reformed Tradition, 13 THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY JOURNAL 4, 43-58 (Winter 1982).
186. HISTORICAL COMMITTEE ARCHIVES OF THE MENNONITE CHURCH USA,
Christlicher Ordnung or Christian Discipline Being a Collection and Translation of Anabap-
tist and Amish-Mennonite Church Disciplines (Artikel and Ordnungen) of 1527, 1568,
1607, 1630, 1668, 1688, 1779, 1809, 1837, and 1865, with Historical Explanations and
Notes, available at http://www.mcusa-archives.org/library/resolutions/amishdisci-
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in 1993.192 The statement explains the prohibition in terms of the
non-resistance commitment of Christianity and the sharp duality
between church and state. 193 It cites scriptural endorsement of the
secular state's use of coercion to maintain order but states that
Christians are forbidden to be involved in such "eye for an eye"
activities and are bound to "resist not evil" and to "turn the other
cheek." 19 4 The statement also cites Jesus' reply to Pilate thatJesus'
servants do not fight because his kingdom is not of "this world."1 95
This suggests that Christians have no right to judge others as they
belong to Jesus' kingdom, not "the world's."1 96 The statement con-
cludes by addressing the argument that, if the state is authorized to
judge others, then a Christian's service to the state in that process
falls under that authorization. 19 7 This reasoning is rejected on the
grounds that it would absolve the executioner from the moral guilt
of executing on behalf of the state and soldiers from the moral guilt
of killing on behalf of the state. 198 It is the individual who must give
account to God, not the state.' 9 9 Service on a jury is listed along-
side other similar violations of non-resistance and non-conformity:
voting, office-holding, political involvement, and lobbying.2 0 0 In-
volving one's self in the judicial system is to "return evil for evil," "to
use force," and to "become unequally yoked with unbelievers." 20 1
For these Anabaptists, objection to jury service is essential to the
exercise of their faith. What remains to be explored is whether the
United States Constitution recognizes a free exercise claim to be
exempted from jury service.
III.
INTERPRETING THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The Anabaptist convictions against jury service are useful illus-
trations of a religious claim for exemption under the Constitution.
192. SOUTHEASTERN MENNONITE CONFERENCE, Church and State Issues Relating
to Jury Duty (1993), available at http://www.bibleviews.com/jury.html (last visited
Jul. 15, 2009).
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Daniel 4:7; Romans 12:17-19, 13:1-8; Matthew 5:38-40, 16:18,
28:19-20).
195. Id. (citing Luke 12:14, 9:51-56;John 18:36).
196. Id. (citing I Corinthians 5:12-13; Philippians 3:20; Acts 5:29).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (citing Proverbs 24:13; Matthew 16:27; I Peter 1:17; Revelation 20:13,
22:12).
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing II Corinthians 6:14).
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For the Anabaptists who object, the objection is essential to the ex-
ercise of their faith. They cannot consider themselves faithful
Christians if they serve on a jury. For the conservative Anabaptists,
the separation of church and state is essential. Historically, the
Anabaptists were the first Christians since Constantine who advo-
cated the separation of church and state. 20 2 Thus, given that the
modem liberal political ideal of church-state separation originated
with the Anabaptists, it is especially fitting and interesting to deter-
mine how the United States Constitution protects Anabaptist
church members from forced service to the state through the jury
system.203
In order to understand the constitutional values at issue, it is
important to understand the development of the Supreme Court's
doctrine protecting the free exercise of religion. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause has progressed
through three distinct historical eras, discussed in the subparts that
follow. 20 4 Because the free exercise of religion is a constitutional
principle, the Anabaptist man in the opening anecdote has a claim
to constitutional protection against compelled participation in a
jury, as do others who object to jury service on religious grounds.
A. The Development of Free Exercise Jurisprudence
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Court addressed
the Free Exercise Clause with a marked secular mindset.20 5 The
defining case of the era, Reynolds v. United States, arose from a
charge of bigamy against a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints. 20 6 In this now-famous case, the Court rejected
the appellant's claim that the law violated the Free Exercise Clause
of the First Amendment.2 0 7 It held that although the First Amend-
ment forbade the government from enacting laws that interfere in
religious beliefs and opinions, it did not prohibit the enactment of
laws restricting religious practices. 20 8 The Court said that prevent-
202. See Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement
in the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1403-04 (2004).
203. See Bender, supra note 128, at 3.
204. See Claire McCusker, Comment, When Church and State Collide: Averting
Democratic Disaffection in a Post-Smith World, 25 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 391, 393-94
(2007).
205. See id.
206. 98 U.S. 145, 146, 161 (1878). The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints is commonly referred to as the Mormon Church.
207. Id. at 162, 166-67.
208. Id. at 166. The Court proposed two historically-based scenarios to illus-
trate the need for such a restriction on religious practices: (1) the possibility of
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ing the government from restricting religious practices would
"make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law
of the land, and [would] in effect . permit every citizen to be-
come a law unto himself."20 9
Eighty-five years after the Reynolds decision, the Court ushered
in a new era of free exercise jurisprudence with its decision in Sher-
bert v. Verner.210 In Sherbert, a member of the Seventh Day Adventist
denomination brought a claim under the South Carolina Unem-
ployment Compensation Act (SCUCA) after being denied bene-
fits. 2 1 The appellant had been discharged from her job because
she refused to work on Saturdays, the Sabbath Day of her faith. 212
After searching for another position in her community, and being
unable to find employment that did not require her to work on
Saturdays, she filed a claim for unemployment compensation. 21 3 In
their review of the appellant's claim for benefits, the Employment
Security Commission sought to determine whether the claimant
was disqualified from claiming benefits under the SCUCA for fail-
ing, without good cause, to either apply for suitable work or accept
suitable work when offered to her.2 14 The statute clarified the
religiously sanctioned human sacrifice, and (2) the possibility of a religious re-
quirement that a wife burn herself on the funeral pyre of her deceased husband.
Id.
209. Id. at 167. Although the Court's holding in Reynolds may be read as plac-
ing secular law expressly above religious doctrine, Reynolds confined the principle
to those instances in which a defendant had the intent to break the law because his
religious beliefs dictated that "the law ought not to have been enacted." Id. The
Court explained the intent requirement in light of Regina v. Wagstaff, 10 Cox Crim.
Cases, 531 (1868). In Regina, a child died and her parents were charged with man-
slaughter for refusing to call for medical assistance during the illness. The Regina
court held that the parents were not guilty of manslaughter as their religious be-
liefs dictated that what they were doing for the child would ultimately lead to her
recovery. The Court in Reynolds compared these facts to a hypothetical situation in
which the parents refused to feed their child because their religion dictated that
the child not be fed. Commenting on this hypothetical, the Court stated that
"when the offence consists of a positive act which is knowingly done, it would be
dangerous to hold that the offender might escape punishment because he relig-
iously believed the law which he had broken ought never to have been made."
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167.
210. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
211. Id. at 399-400.
212. Id. at 399.
213. Id. at 399-400.
214. Id. at 401 (citing SCUCA). The relevant section of the SCUCA reads as
follows:
(3) Failure to accept work. (a) If the Commission finds that he has failed,
without good cause, (i) either to apply for available suitable work, when so
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Commission's duty with the following language describing "suitable
work":
In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an indi-
vidual, the Commission shall consider the degree of risk in-
volved to his health, safety and morals, his physical fitness and
prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of
unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his
customary occupation and the distance of the available work
from his residence. 215
Though authorized to consider each of these individualized
exceptions to suitable work, the Commission refused to consider
the appellant's religious objections to working on Saturdays. 216 The
Commission instead viewed the appellant's refusal to work on Sat-
urdays as a reason to disqualify her from claiming benefits under
the SCUCA. 217 Having had her claim rejected, the appellant
brought suit against the Employment Security Commission for vio-
lating the Free Exercise Clause. 218 The South Carolina Supreme
Court held that the appellant was disqualified from claiming bene-
fits because she was not "available for work" as required by SCUCA
and was unwilling to accept suitable other work.219
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court began its analysis by
reiterating the holding in Reynolds that, although the government
may not restrict a person's religious beliefs or opinions, it may re-
strict "conduct or actions." 220 Unlike Reynolds, though, which dealt
with a blanket restriction on the practice of polygamy, Sherbert in-
volved a law that contained a series of individualized exceptions.221
These exceptions provided the government with a series of reasons
for finding a job unsuitable but neglected to contain an entry for
religious objection to specific types of employment. 222 Because the
Employment Commission afforded these non-religious exceptions
greater weight than the appellant's religious objection to the spe-
cific type of work, the Court was forced to determine whether this
directed by the employment office or the Commission, (ii) to accept available
suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer.
374 U.S. at 400 n.3.
215. Id. at 400 n.3 (citing SCUCA).
216. Id. at 401.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Sherbert v. Verner, 125 S.E.2d 737, 745 (S.C. 1962), rev'd, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
220. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
221. See id. at 402; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
222. See id.
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preference amounted to an infringement of the appellant's Free
Exercise rights. 2
23
In coming to its decision, the Court applied a two-step analysis.
The first step was to determine whether the governmental action
imposed "any burden on the free exercise of [the] appellant's relig-
ion."22 4 To this end, the Court acknowledged a burden, finding
that the appellant was forced to choose between following the
"precepts of her religion and forfeiting her benefits." 22 5 This
choice, the Court stated, amounted to "the same kind of burden
upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against
appellant for her Saturday worship. '2 26 Having found a burden,
the Court then proceeded to its second step: applying a compelling
interest test.227 This test required that the government show some
compelling interest to infringe upon the appellant's First Amend-
ment rights. 228 The Employment Commission asserted that, by re-
jecting the appellant's claim, it was avoiding a possible onslaught of
frivolous claims from claimants feigning religious objections, which
would dilute its unemployment compensation fund. 229 The Court
rejected this argument, finding that "there [was] no proof whatever
to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit," and, even if such a
consideration were made, it would be "foreclosed by the prohibi-
tion against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious be-
liefs."2 30 Furthermore, the Court held that even if such claims did
threaten the unemployment compensation fund, the Commission
would be required to show that "no alternative forms of regulation
would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment
rights."231 With the government unable to satisfy the compelling
interest test, the Court overturned the decision of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court.
232
223. See id. at 401-10.
224. Id. at 403.
225. Id. at 404.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 406.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 407. In rejecting the government's claim that a compelling inter-
est existed due to the possibility that frivolous claims would deplete its unemploy-
ment compensation fund, the Court noted that even if this were so, the
government would have to prove that no less-restrictive alternatives existed to pre-
vent such fraud. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 407, 410.
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The extended protections granted by the Supreme Court's
Sherbert decision continued unfettered for twenty-seven years and
produced several free exercise cases that relied on the compelling
interest test.2 33 Despite a seemingly unanimous application of the
test to Free Exercise issues during this period, the Court ultimately
constrained its use of the test in a contentious 5-4 vote in Employ-
ment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, ush-
ering in the current era of Free Exercise jurisprudence.2 34
The Smith case concerned two members of the Native Ameri-
can Church who were fired from their jobs as counselors at a drug
rehabilitation organization for having ingested peyote during a re-
ligious ceremony. 235 The appellants attempted to collect unem-
ployment benefits from the Employment Division, which denied
their claims based upon the fact that they were fired for work-re-
lated misconduct. 236 The appellants filed suit, arguing that the de-
nial of their claims was a violation of the Free Exercise Clause and
that, under Sherbert, they were entitled to unemployment compensa-
tion.2 3 7 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the Employment
Division's denial of benefits, and the Oregon Supreme Court up-
held the lower court's ruling based upon Sherbert.238 The Employ-
ment Division then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.2 39
In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia rejected the application
of the Sherbert compelling interest test to the situation in Smith. 240
The Court said the distinction between the two cases was in the
construction of the law being applied.24' In Sherbert, the Unemploy-
233. See Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); Hobbie v. Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987); United States v. Lee,
455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div.,
450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-29 (1978) (plurality
opinion); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972); Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403; see also Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); W. Va.
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
234. 494 U.S. 872, 884-85 (1990).
235. Id. at 874.
236. Id. The employee's work-related misconduct stemmed from their viola-
tion of the Oregon law prohibiting the possession of peyote-a requirement for
their continued employment under the rehabilitation center's policy statement.
Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 874-75.
239. Id. at 875.
240. See id.
241. See id.
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ment Compensation Act created a system of individualized excep-
tions that allowed the Commission to except situations based upon
their determination of whether certain work was suitable for the
claimant. 242 Because these exceptions existed, the Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause required the government to afford the
same status to decisions based upon religious beliefs. 243 In Smith,
on the other hand, the law was neutral and of general applicability,
providing no exceptions from a denial of a claim based on work-
related misconduct. 244 In reviewing such a law, the question is not
whether the government is required to extend equal treatment to
decisions based upon religious beliefs, but rather whether decisions
based upon religious beliefs should be afforded protections other-
wise unavailable. 245
Under this rubric, the Court declined to apply the Sherbert com-
pelling interest test, applying instead the Reynolds proposition that
"while [government action] cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices. " 246 Where laws of gen-
eral applicability are involved, the Court stated, such laws must im-
pinge upon "other constitutional protections, such as [the]
freedom of speech and of the press" as well as the Free Exercise
Clause in order to be struck down. 247 Cases that do not present
such hybrid situations, therefore, are subject to governmental re-
striction under Reynolds.248 Having found no constitutional in-
fringements outside of the Free Exercise Clause, the Court upheld
the Oregon law and reversed the Oregon Supreme Court's decision
to grant the appellants unemployment compensation. 249 As a re-
242. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 400 n.3 (1963) (citing SCUCA).
243. Id. at 410.
244. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878-79 (1990).
245. Id. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878)).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 881.
248. See id. at 882.
249. Id. at 890. In a strongly worded concurrence, Justice O'Connor objected
to the majority's decision not to apply the Sherbert test to laws of general applicabil-
ity. Id. at 891-907 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor, joined by jus-
tices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, argued that the majority's decision
disregarded the applicability of the Court's prior free exercise jurisprudence. Id.
Under Sherbert and the Court's pre-Smith cases, the compelling interest test af-
forded to the First Amendment protections equal to "the barest level of minimum
scrutiny that the Equal Protection Clause already provides." Id. at 894 (quoting
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987)).
The majority's decision in Smith, however, separated laws of general applicability
from these protections, even though the laws may affect a defendant's religious
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suit of Smith, the compelling interest test continues to hold only for
those laws that are not laws of general applicability.2 5 0
Since its decision in Smith, the Supreme Court has had the op-
portunity to revisit the issues giving rise to the decision. 25' In
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, the Court
remained loyal to the dual testing systems created by Smith and Sher-
bert.252 In Hialeah, adherents of the Santeria religion who had in-
corporated their church under the laws of Florida leased property
in the city of Hialeah with the intent to establish a worship center,
school, cultural center, and museum. 253 Community reaction to
this decision was overwhelmingly negative, and the residents of Hi-
aleah brought their complaints to the city council.254 After a public
conduct to the same extent as laws directly targeting the defendant's religious
practices. Id. at 876-83. By requiring that laws of general applicability offend
other constitutionally protected rights,Justice O'Connor argued that the majority
effectively created a sub-class of First Amendment rights. Id. at 894 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The majority's reasoning that laws of general applicability are "'one
large step' removed from laws aimed at specific religious practices" and should be
afforded less protection fails according to the minority because 1) the First
Amendment does not distinguish between generally applicable and specifically
targeting laws, and 2) the majority ignored the practical reality that lawmakers
would never knowingly prohibit a specific religious practice under the compelling
interest test when they could easily rewrite the law to be generally applicable and
have fewer restrictions. Id. According to the dissent, any implication of First
Amendment rights, whether through a general or specific law, should trigger the
same constitutional concerns-concerns that should be protected by requiring the
government to show a compelling state interest and narrowly tailored law. Id. at
892-905.
250. See id. at 888. Smith's application to rules of general applicability has
today been complicated as the result of legislative initiative. Just three years after
the Court issued its decision in Smith, the United States Congress passed the Relig-
ious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which rejected the Smith holding and re-
quired the courts to adhere to the compelling interest test in reviewing all laws of
general applicability under the Free Exercise Clause. Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified in scattered sections
of 5 and 42 U.S.C.). Application of the RFRA was challenged, and in City of Boerne
v. bores, the Court struck down the law, citing it as an unconstitutional extension
of Congress's enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Although the federal government was
unable to dictate the use of the compelling interest test over the states, many states
have enacted their own versions of the RFRA which require their own courts to use
the compelling interest test when interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. See Mc-
Cusker, supra note 204, at 395.
251. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 530 (1993).
252. Id. at 546.
253. Id. at 525-26.
254. Id. at 541.
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meeting, the city council enacted a series of ordinances intended to
block the church's members from taking part in a central tenant of
the Santeria religion: ritual animal sacrifice.2 55
The city passed another series of ordinances following the
council meeting.256 The first of these ordinances defined "sacri-
fice" as "to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an
animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary
purpose of food consumption." 257 The ordinance went on to state
an exception for "licensed establishment[s]" that slaughtered ani-
mals "specifically raised for food purposes." 258 A subsequent ordi-
nance defined "slaughter" as "'the killing of animals for food' and
prohibited slaughter outside of those areas zoned for slaughter-
house use." 259 Following the passage of these final ordinances, the
church brought suit against the city alleging violation of its mem-
bers' free exercise rights. 2 60 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision that the ordinances did not violate free
exercise rights. 26
1
In his majority opinion for the Supreme Court,262 Justice Ken-
nedy began his review of the ordinance by determining whether it
255. Id. at 526. The first resolution passed by the council expressed concern
"'that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent
with public morals, peace or safety,' and declared that '[t]he City reiterates its
commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious
groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety."' Id. Following
this resolution, the council passed Ordinance 87-40, which incorporated the lan-
guage of the Florida animal cruelty laws to prohibit the unnecessary or cruel kill-
ing of any animal. Id. Wishing to have the state's position on its law clarified, the
city of Hialeah solicited an opinion from the Florida Attorney General as to
whether the state law did in fact prohibit the ritualistic sacrifice of animals. Id. at
526-28. Because the ritualistic killing of animals is not ultimately intended to pro-
vide food for human consumption, the Attorney General concluded that such sac-
rificial killings were in fact violative of the state animal cruelty law. Id.
256. Id. at 527-28.
257. Id. at 527 (quoting City of Hialeah Resolution 87-52).
258. Id. at 527-28 (quoting City of Hialeah Resolution 87-52).
259. Id. at 528 (quoting City of Hialeah Resolution 87-72).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 530.
262. Id. at 523-48. The Supreme Court's decision in the case, handed down
just three years after its decision in Smith, continued to show strong divisions
within the Court. Id. While all of the justices agreed that the Church members'
free exercise rights had been violated, they differed as to the tests and methods of
analysis that should be used to come to this conclusion. Id. Justices Blackmun and
O'Connor continued their argument that Smith had been wrongly decided and
that all equal protection issues should be decided under the Sherbert compelling
interest test. Id. at 577-80 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The majority of justices,
however, continued to support the Smith test, with slight discrepancies between
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would be subjected to the Smith test.263 In making this determina-
tion, Justice Kennedy looked at whether the ordinances were neu-
tral and of general applicability.264 The distinction between these
two elements, as noted by both Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia in
his concurring opinion, is difficult to ascertain as both concepts are
"interrelated" and "substantially overlap." 265 According to both jus-
tices, failure to satisfy one element necessarily implies the failure of
the other. 266
Justice Kennedy began his analysis of the law's neutrality by
looking at whether the law was facially neutral, and whether the law,
if facially neutral, was intended to "target... religious conduct for
distinctive treatment."267 A law is not facially neutral if "it refers to
a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the
language or context."268 A law that fails this test of facial neutrality
falls outside the realm of the Smith test and into the realm of the
more restrictive Sherbert test.269 In determining whether the law was
one of general applicability, Justice Kennedy followed the reason-
them on how the test should be applied. Id. at 523-48. Ultimately, the decision
resulted in a more detailed and slightly expanded exposition on when a law would
be subject to the Smith test. Id.
263. Id. at 531-32.
264. Id. at 531-46.
265. Id. at 531, 557-59.
266. Id. at 557-59 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy failed to note Jus-
tice Scalia's distinction between the applications of these two principles. Id. Ac-
cording to Justice Scalia, analysis of a law's neutrality would function for those
circumstances in which a law "by [its] terms impose[s] disabilities on the basis of
religion." Id. at 557 (emphasis in original). And analysis of whether a law is gen-
erally applicable is appropriate for those laws that are neutral by their terms, but
"through their design, construction, or enforcement target the practices of a par-
ticular religion for discriminatory treatment." Id. The distinction between these
two applications is muted, however, by the fact that "a law that is not of general
applicability ... can be considered 'nonneutral'; and certainly no law that is non-
neutral ... can be thought to be of general applicability." Id. at 557-58.
267. Id. at 533-34.
268. Id. at 533.
269. Id. at 534. A law that is facially neutral, however, may fail the neutrality
test if it is intended to "target... religious conduct for distinctive treatment." Id.
In looking to see whether the law targeted religious conduct, Justice Kennedy
looked at the law itself, its effects, and the intent behind its enactment. Id. at
523-48. By viewing both the effects and intent of the law, Justice Kennedy sought
to enable the Court to look into both the circumstances leading up to the law's
enactment and the law's operation following enactment. Id. A majority ofjustices,
however, refused to join Justice Kennedy in his opinion that the court should look
to the intent of the law to determine its neutrality. Id. at 533-48. Review of
whether a law targeted a particular religion is therefore limited to a review of the
law itself and its effects on religious conduct. Id. at 533-42, 557-81.
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ing in Smith and looked to whether exceptions had been carved out
of the law for conduct other than that sought to be protected under
the Free Exercise Clause. 2 70 Those laws that do provide exceptions
would be subject to the Sherbert test, while those that do not would
be considered of general applicability subject to the Smith test.27 1
Under both the requirements, the Court concluded that the
Sherbert compelling interest test should be applied. 272 After review-
ing the language and history of the ordinances, the Court found
that the ordinances were not neutral and were, therefore, subject to
the Sherbert compelling interest test.273 The Court's review of the
ordinances' general applicability resulted in a similar conclusion.274
The ordinances sought to prohibit cruelty to animals and promote
public health. 275 In the City's application of the ordinances, how-
ever, the ordinances failed to prohibit, and in many cases expressly
allowed, many instances of nonreligious animal killing.2 76 As exam-
ples, the Court cited allowances for fishing, rodent extermination,
and euthanasia of stray domesticated animals.27 7 The City's public
health argument that allowing the ritual sacrifice of animals would
270. Compare City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 542-46 with Employment Div., Dep't
of Human Res. Of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
271. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 542-46.
272. See id.
273. Id. Applying these rules to the ordinances challenged by the Church,
the Court first noted that the ordinances did not seem to be neutral on their face.
Id. at 542. Three of the ordinances contained the terms "sacrifice" and "ritual",
both of which hold "strong religious connotations." Id. at 534. The Court refused
to make a determination on the law's neutrality on this evidence alone, however,
as the two terms had recently acquired a secular meaning. Id. Being so, the Court
sought to determine whether the ordinances targeted the Church's religious con-
duct. Id. at 534-40. Reviewing the ordinances themselves, the Court noted strong
evidence of targeting in the language of the City's initial resolution. Id. at 534-36.
The resolution read: "residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah have expressed
their concern that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are
inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety ... [and the city is committed] to
prohibit any and all [such] acts of any and all religious groups." Id. at 535. Fur-
ther evidence of targeting was found in the effects of the ordinance. Id. at 535-36.
Here, the Court noted that "the ordinances when considered together disclose an
object remote from [the City's] legitimate concern [ " of reducing animal cruelty.
Id. at 535. "The design of these laws accomplishes instead a 'religious gerryman-
der,' . . . an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious prac-
tices." Id. Such statements arose from the fact that the ordinances themselves
prohibited "few if any animal killings" other than those resulting from the
Church's ritual sacrifices. Id. at 536.
274. Id. at 542-46.
275. Id. at 543.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 543-44.
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lead to improper disposal of animal carcasses also failed as the
Court pointed out that no restrictions were placed on hunters who
were allowed to process their own meat following the killing of the
animal. 278 Finally, the Court pointed out that the City's ordinance
restricting the slaughter of animals to certain zoned areas was un-
derinclusive on its face because it allowed exemptions for the
slaughter of a small number of animals to persons or groups who
sold the meat commercially. 279 For each of these reasons, the
Court found the ordinances not generally applicable and, there-
fore, subjected them to the Sherbert compelling interest test.280
Applying the Sherbert test to the ordinances, the Court found
that the City failed to meet its burden of showing a compelling in-
terest to infringe upon the Church members' free exercise
rights. 28 1 In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that be-
cause the ordinances were underinclusive in their application, and
because the City provided no compelling interest to prohibit
Church member conduct when it allowed the same conduct from
others, the ordinances violated the Church's free exercise rights. 28 2
The changes in free exercise jurisprudence that arose from the
decisions in Smith and its progeny established a two-part test for
those laws alleged to be violative of an individual's free exercise
rights. First, it must be determined whether the law is neutral and
of general applicability. If so, the law will be analyzed under the
Smith hybrid test that requires the law to infringe upon another
constitutionally protected right in order to be unconstitutional. If
the law is found to be non-neutral or not generally applicable, the
more stringent Sherbert compelling interest test will be used.
B. Free Exercise and Compulsory Jury Service
Should the denial of a religious exemption for jury service be
challenged under current free exercise jurisprudence, the denial
would not survive. The first step in the analysis is to determine
whether to apply the Smith hybrid test or the more restrictive Sher-
bert compelling interest test. Under the doctrine laid out in City of
Hialeah, this analysis begins by determining whether the jury selec-
tion laws are neutral and of general applicability. 283
278. Id. at 544.
279. Id. at 545.
280. Id. at 545-46.
281. Id. at 547.
282. Id. at 546-47.
283. Id. at 531-46.
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The test for neutrality laid out in City of Hialeah points to two
separate factors: (1) whether the law is facially neutral, and (2)
whether the law, if facially neutral, was intended to "target... relig-
ious conduct for distinctive treatment."2 84 The language in each
state and federal law dealing with compulsory jury service contains
no express provision requiring service by individuals associated with
any specific religious faith. Nor are there any underlying refer-
ences to terms carrying any specifically religious meaning. 285 The
laws themselves each turn upon their distinct purpose of attempt-
ing to provide a significant number of jurors to satisfy the constitu-
tional rights of the accused. 286 With this being so, there appears to
be no lack of facial neutrality in the laws. Thus, we must then turn
to determining whether the laws target religious objectors.
At this point, the murky and overlapping nature of the distinc-
tion between neutrality and general applicability again raises its
head.287 In City of Hialeah, the ordinances passed by the city council
were specifically drafted for the distinct purposes of prohibiting the
ritual animal sacrifice of animals by proponents of the Santeria
faith.28 8 Evidence of the ordinances' lack of neutrality could be
found in the terms of the ordinances, the fact that the ordinances
only effected animal sacrifice as it applied to members of the
church, and, according to Justice Kennedy, the intent of the ordi-
nances as evidenced by their legislative history.289 However, the im-
portant aspect is not the neutrality of the laws as they were drafted
but rather the unintended effects the laws have on religious con-
duct. Here, as both Justices Kennedy and Scalia noted, it may be
necessary to look to the question of general applicability to deter-
mine whether the laws are neutral.290
Review of the laws' general applicability can be viewed in terms
of either the City of Hialeah decision or the earlier Smith decision.
In both cases, the determinative issue was whether the laws carved
out exceptions to their applicability. 29 1 In Smith, the law in ques-
tion, which made it illegal to consume peyote, did not provide an
exception for the religious or other use of the drug.292 The Court
284. Id. at 533-34.
285. See discussion supra Part I.A.
286. See discussion supra Part I.A.
287. See City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 533-42.
288. Id. at 540.
289. Id. at 533-42.
290. Id. at 531, 557-59.
291. Id. at 542-46; Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
292. Smith, 494 U.S. at 876.
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stated that such generally applicable laws are not required to pro-
vide a religious exception unless the law also infringes upon an-
other constitutionally protected right.29 3 In City of Hialeah, the
Court found itself in the opposite position of reviewing a set of laws
that provided a number of individualized exceptions. 294 In City of
Hialeah, the stated goals of the City's ordinances were to prevent
animal cruelty and to protect the public health.295 Because the
Court found the laws to include exceptions for hunting, fishing,
extermination, and the slaughter of a small number of animals for
commercial purposes, the Court stated that the City could not re-
fuse to carve out a religious exception for the ritual sacrifice of ani-
mals without first providing a compelling government interest for
refusing to do so. 29 6
When comparing the laws associated with compulsory jury duty
to those in the Smith and City of Hialeah decisions, it is necessary to
note the large number of disqualifications and exceptions provided
in the compulsory jury duty laws. 29 7 These disqualifications and ex-
ceptions range from the compelling-disqualification due to hav-
ing an interest in the litigation-to the somewhat more mundane-
not being able to provide a babysitter for a child.298 Regardless of
whether these exceptions are compelling, the issue is that they pro-
vide a government-sanctioned benefit to a subset of the population
while refusing to provide this same benefit to another subset seek-
ing to exercise its constitutionally protected freedoms under the
Free Exercise Clause.
These exceptions alone provide compelling evidence that the
laws should not be dealt with under the Smith hybrid test. However,
the laws themselves go a step further in confirming this determina-
tion based on the high level of individualized government assess-
ment associated with the voir dire process. 299 In Smith, the Court
noted that it refused to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test
because Sherbert "was developed in a context that lent itself to indi-
vidualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant
conduct."30 0 In Sherbert, the officer in charge of dispensing employ-
293. See id. at 879.
294. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
543-44 (1993).
295. Id. at 543.
296. Id. at 546-47.
297. See supra Part I.A.
298. See supra Part I.A.
299. See supra Part I.A.
300. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
884 (1990).
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ment benefits had the authority to determine whether the claimant
refused employment for "good cause." 30 1 This authority created a
situation where the Court felt that, in order to protect the free exer-
cise rights of the claimant, it must subject the law in question to a
high level of scrutiny.30 2 In Smith, the Court expressly refused to
apply the same strict scrutiny test to a situation where no exceptions
were allowed and no individualized assessment was made by the
government.3
03
During voir dire, both the court and each litigant's lawyers are
given the authority to investigate and strike potential jurors with or
without cause.30 4 This system, like the one present in Sherbert,
grants government officials-whether the judge or the lawyers as
servants of the court-great leeway in determining the fate of a po-
tentialjuror.3 0 5 Such discretion will, as it did in Sherbert, subject the
law to the greater scrutiny provided by the compelling interest test
in order to sufficiently protect the potential juror's free exercise
rights. 30 6 The Sherbert compelling interest test requires that: (1) the
government show that it has some compelling interest to infringe
301. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 401 (1963).
302. See id. at 406-08.
303. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
304. See supra Part I.A.
305. See supra Part I.A.
306. Although this analysis finds that state and federal laws regarding compul-
sory jury service as applied to Anabaptists requires application of-and ultimately
fulfills-the Sherbert compelling interest test, it should be pointed out that the re-
sults would be the same under the Smith hybrid test. Application of the Smith hy-
brid test would find that the Anabaptist First Amendment right to free speech
would be infringed by requiring Anabaptists to speak out against the accused and
place the civic laws of the government above their more highly regarded laws of
God. The situation is analogous to that of the children in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In that case, the Court concluded that
the children's constitutional right to freedom of speech was violated when the
state imposed penalties on the children after they refused to salute and pledge
allegiance to the American flag. Id. at 629-30. The children in Barnette were Jeho-
vah's Witnesses and held the belief that pledging allegiance would violate their
belief that allegiance to God is placed above that of country. Id. The Court found
that the children's refusal to salute and pledge the flag was constitutionally pro-
tected and held that the Board of Education could not silence their dissent with-
out first showing that a "clear and present danger" existed in allowing the children
to refrain from taking part in the salute and pledge. Id. at 633. Like Barnette, the
Anabaptist failure to take part in speaking out for or against the accused in court
infringes upon their constitutionally protected freedom of speech and thus fulfills
the Smith hybrid test. Compulsory speech, as found in both Barnette and the Ana-
baptist jury service situation, finds strong support in qualifying a claim under the
hybrid test. The Smith Court itself cited Barnette as an example of a case that in-
fringed upon both free exercise and free speech rights. Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
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upon the appellant's First Amendment rights, and (2) the law be
narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interest.30 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court has provided insight into
whether the government would be able to present a compelling in-
terest in the jury service context. In In reJenison, a potential juror
sought to be exempted from jury service because her religion re-
quired her not to judge others.3 0 8 The trial court rejected her argu-
ment that she was exempt because service was in conflict with her
religious principles and held her in contempt for her refusal to
serve. 30 9 After serving seven days in custody, the potential juror was
released pending review of her case upon appeal. 310 In its first re-
view of the case, the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled against the
potential juror, finding the lack of religious exception analogous to
laws punishing conscientious objectors. 311 Under the conscientious
objector statutes, the exception for service on a jury must be ex-
tended by the legislature, and the court found that similar exemp-
tion from the state's compulsory jury service laws require the
same.312 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court remanded
the case for the state court to consider the Court's decision in Sher-
bert.313 The state supreme court's second decision in the case re-
versed its earlier decision and held that the government failed to
provide the court with a compelling interest to override "the [po-
tential juror's] right to the free exercise of her religion." 314 The
court specifically rejected the government's argument that the state
had a compelling interest in acquiring competentjurors to sit on its
juries. 315
It is extraordinarily difficult to conceive that the Supreme
Court could find the government's interest in acquiring competent
jurors compelling. The wide range of exceptions provided in the
compulsory jury service laws provides ample evidence that the laws
themselves are not dependent upon universal participation. Large
numbers of exemptions are allowed for a wide range of reasons that
Anabaptist dissent from compulsory jury service would similarly find qualification
under the Smith hybrid test through free exercise and free speech violations.
307. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963).




311. Id. at 519.
312. Id.
313. In reJenison, 375 U.S. 14, 14 (1963).
314. In reJenison, 125 N.W.2d 588, 589 (Minn. 1963).
315. Id.
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fail to rise to the level of importance of protected constitutional
rights. 3 16 Any argument that such an interest would be compelling
is therefore weak and unlikely to sway the Court.
In addition to the requirement that the government provide a
compelling interest in order to infringe upon the appellant's First
Amendment rights, the government has the additional hurdle of
showing that the law is narrowly tailored to achieve its interest.
31 7
In this instance, provided the large number of exceptions allowed
by the compulsory jury service laws, the government cannot refute
the charge that its laws are underinclusive. Like the ordinances in
City of Hialeah, which provided exceptions for the commercial
slaughter of animals outside of zoned areas, fishing, and hunt-
ing,3 18 the compulsory jury service laws each provide a large num-
ber of exemptions ranging from those for students to those for
good cause. In providing for these exemptions, the government
"fail[s] to prohibit nonreligious conduct.., in a similar or greater
degree than [an exemption]" for religious reasons would.3 19 The
laws, therefore, fail to be narrowly tailored in achieving their intent.
In conclusion, two separate and distinct tests have evolved to
determine the constitutionality of laws alleged to infringe upon the
free exercise of religion. There is little room for a government ar-
gument that failure to provide an exemption for service based upon
religious convictions complies with our free exercise rules. The
large number of nonreligious exemptions and the deference to in-
dividualized government assessment in the voir dire process doom
the government argument. Thus, so long as multiple non-religious
exemptions to jury service are provided, the Constitution requires
an exemption for those who object to jury service on religious
grounds.
IV.
PROPOSAL MODELED ON MILITARY
CONSCIENTIOUS EXEMPTION
Having concluded that so long as multiple nonreligious ex-
emptions to jury service are provided, the Constitution requires an
exemption from jury service for those who object on religious
grounds, this Part develops a proposed exemption to fulfill that re-
316. See supra Part I.A.
317. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
318. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546-47 (1993).
319. Id. at 543.
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quirement. In constructing the proposal, it is illustrative to con-
sider the conscientious objector exemption from military service
for several reasons. First, it is the quintessential conscientious ob-
jection exemption in American legal history.320 Second, military
conscription and jury conscription are quite conceptually similar.
Both involve requiring involuntary service of citizens in an essential
activity of American government. When volunteers are insufficient
for military or jury service, service is required regardless of personal
convenience or preference. Third, as a matter of history, the mili-
tary exemption was created primarily for the benefit of Anabaptists
and Quakers.3 21 Jury service, for the Anabaptists, involves the same
conflict of conscience. Fourth, as described below, a conscientious
objector exemption from military service has long been statutorily
granted, while no similar exemption for jury service has been
made. 322 Thus, given the similarities between the two, the long-
standing statutory military exemption is especially useful for model-
ing a statutory exemption to jury service.
320. KENT GREENAWALT, 1 RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FRE EXERCISE
AND FAIRNESS 49 (2006).
321. Major Joseph B. Mackey, Reclaiming the In-Service Conscientious Objection
Program: Proposals for Creating a Meaningful Limitation to the Claim of Conscientious
Objection, ARMY LAW, Aug. 2008, at 31, 32 & n.12. Quaker refusal to engage in
warfare against the Native Americans ultimately cost them the right to govern
Pennsylvania, which had been founded by William Penn, a prominent Friend. For
an introduction to this history, see, e.g., Guy Franklin Hershberger, Pacifism and the
State in Colonial Pennsylvania, 8 CHURCH HIST., 54, 54-74 (1939). Quakers led the
earliest massive noncompliance with draft laws (in West New Jersey in 1704). STE-
PHEN M. KOHN, JAILED FOR PEACE: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRATr LAw VIOLA-
TORS, 1658-1985 6 (1986). The Anabaptists were later in their migration, but were
sufficiently organized by the Civil War to petition Abraham Lincoln for an exemp-
tion from military service. DRIEDGER & KRAYBILL, supra note 137, at 27-29, 31, 57.
Their request was honored in the 1864 Military Draft Act, which was the first post-
Colonial exemption specifically for conscientious objectors. Mackey, supra, at 31,
32.
322. As a result of the statutory grant of the exemption, the Supreme Court
has never had an occasion to consider the constitutional free exercise arguments
of religious objectors to military service. The Supreme Court itself noted the issue
remains open as to whether the Free Exercise Clause grants a constitutional ex-
emption from military service to sincere religious objectors who object to participa-
tion in all wars. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 n.23 (1971). Since the
statute provides broad protection, the constitutional issue is unlikely to arise for
review. Nevertheless, some secondary sources obfuscate the issue by simply stating
that military exemption is a matter of statutory, rather than constitutional, right.
See, e.g., 53 AM. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 99 (2006).
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A. Military Conscientious Objector Exemption
Due primarily to the Quaker resistance to military conscrip-
tions, colonial governments established a conscientious objector ex-
emption to military service. 323 During the Revolutionary War, the
Continental Congress exempted religious conscientious objec-
tors. 324 Four states' representatives to the Constitutional Conven-
tion insisted on constitutional protection for religious objectors to
war, 325 and James Madison's originally proposed Bill of Rights read
that "no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render military service in person. '3 26 The provision
was not ultimately included, most likely because states' rights sup-
porters did not want the federal government undermining the in-
dependence of state militias, which they believed essential to
protect themselves from federal tyranny. 27 The early constitutions
of Delaware, Pennsylvania, New York, and New Hampshire pro-
vided exemptions. 328 The first federal exemption to military service
specifically for conscientious objectors was included in the 1864
Draft Act.3 29
During World War I, the relevant conscientious objector ex-
emption was found in the Selective Service Law of 1917, which pro-
vided as follows:
[N] othing in this Act contained shall be construed to re-
quire or compel any person to serve in any of the forces herein
323. Mackey, supra note 321, at 31-32.
324. KOHN, supra note 321, at 9-10; Brent D. Thomas, The Impact of the Gulf
War on Conscientious Objectors, 61 U. Mo. KAN. CITY L. REv. 67, 71 (1992); Fredrick
L. Brown et al., Conscientious Objection: A Constitutional Right, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV.
552 (1985); John P. C. Fogarty, Note, The Right Not to Kill: A Critical Analysis of
Conscientious Objection and the Problem of Registration, 18 NEW ENG. L. REv. 655,
657-58 (1983); cf Peter Brock, STUDIES IN PEACE HISTORY 33-44 (1991) (describ-
ing a Virginia law passed in 1756 during the French and Indian War which permit-
ted draftees to escape military service "on payment of ten pounds or by providing a
substitute"; Quakers were still morally opposed to paying the fee because doing so
supported the war).
325. Thomas, supra note 324, at 71-72; Maj. David M. Brahms, They Step to a
Different Drummer: A Critical Analysis of the Current Department of Defense Position Vis-a-
Vis In-Service Conscientious Objectors, 47 MIL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1970); Fogarty, supra note
324, at 658.
326. Thomas, supra note 324, at 72; Brown, supra note 324, at 553-54.
327. GREENAWALT, supra note 320, at 50; Thomas, supra note 324, at 72-73;
Brown, supra note 324, at 555.
328. KOHN, supra note 321, at 10.
329. Mackey, supra note 321, at 32. Prior to this Act, other exemptions (such
as ones that could be purchased) provided protection to some conscientious objec-
tors but were not specifically or exclusively for their benefit. Id.
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provided for who is found to be a member of any well-recog-
nized religious sect or organization at present organized and
existing and whose existing creed or principles forbid its mem-
bers to participate in war in any form and whose religious con-
victions are against war or participation therein in accordance
with the creed or principles of said religious organizations, but
no person so exempted shall be exempted from service in any
capacity that the President shall declare to be noncombatant
330
Thus, the exemption during this time was not available to any
individual who conscientiously opposed military service but only to
one who was a member of a well-recognized sect with principles
that prohibited war service. It should also be noted that this ex-
emption still required even a conscientious objector to serve in the
military albeit in a capacity that the President determined to be
"noncombatant."33 1
In 1940 the law was substantially revised. The test was no
longer based upon membership in a well-recognized religious
group that prohibited participation in war, but, rather, was based
upon individual conscientious opposition, by reason of religious
training and belief, to participation in war.3 3 2 Another important
change was that conscientious objectors were not necessarily in-
ducted into the service and assigned non-combatant service (as de-
fined by the President), but rather could provide alternative service
under civilian control. 333 This was very important to many consci-
entious objectors who objected not only to combat but any military
service.33 4
330. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, Pub. L. No. 65-12, 40 Stat. 78 (1917).
331. Despite statutory recognition that the treatment of conscientious objec-
tors during World War I involved legal repression, torture, and mistreatment that
should not be overlooked, it is not directly relevant for purposes of articulating a
jury exemption, and thus a full discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. See
KOHN, supra note 321, at 25-45.
332. 50 App. U.S.C. § 305, Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720,
§ 5, 54 Star. 885, 889 (expired Mar. 31, 1947) (providing for the common defense
by increasing the personnel of the armed forces of the United States and its
training).
333. 53 AM. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 101 (2006).
334. Exactly what counts as a "non-combatant" role in wartime military service
is unclear to many objectors. During World War I, objectors were faced with hav-
ing to declare what they were and were not willing to do, which meant suffering
under their military managers who demanded more than the objectors were will-
ing to do. THE AMISH AND THE STATE, supra note 113, 44-48. In contrast, civilian
control of alternative service projects during World War II was managed by the
Brethren, Mennonite, and Quaker denominations. Id. at 50.
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The 1940 law replaced a membership test with a test based
upon "religious training and belief' regardless of the religious
group to which one belonged. This statutory revision forced courts
to address the meaning of "religious training and belief. '3 35 In re-
sponse, in 1948, Congress amended the statute to define "religious
training and belief' as an "individual's belief in a relation to a Su-
preme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but (not including) essentially political, sociologi-
cal, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code. '3 3 6 In
United States v. Seeger the Supreme Court had to determine what
this definition meant for those who objected to participating in war
but did not necessarily consider themselves "religious" in the terms
used by Congress.337 The Supreme Court concluded that
Congress, in using the expression "Supreme Being" rather
than the designation "God," was merely clarifying the meaning
of religious training and belief so as to embrace all religions
and to exclude essentially political, sociological, or philosophi-
cal views. We believe that under this construction, the test of
belief "in a relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given
belief that is sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the
life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief
in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption. Where
such beliefs have parallel positions in the lives of their respec-
tive holders we cannot say that one is "in a relation to a Su-
preme Being" and the other is not.3 38
In other words, the Supreme Court effectively eliminated the
"Supreme Being" requirement, and so, in response, Congress elimi-
nated the "Supreme Being" language itself from the statute in
1967.339 The following is the current statutory exemption:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require
any person to be subject to combatant training and service in
the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of relig-
ious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to partici-
pation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the term
"religious training and belief' does not include essentially po-
335. See Berman v. United States, 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946); United States
v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943).
336. 380 U.S. 163, 172 (1965).
337. Id. at 165-66.
338. Id.
339. Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (codified at 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j)
(1967)).
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litical, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely per-
sonal moral code. 340
Four years after the Seeger case, the Supreme Court considered
the current language in Welsh v. United States.341 Again, the Su-
preme Court expanded the exemption, concluding that the "sec-
tion exempts from military service all those whose consciences,
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs, would
give them no rest or peace if they allowed themselves to become a
part of an instrument of war."342 This broad definition still does
not include, the Court explained, those opposed to war but "whose
beliefs are not deeply held" and "those whose objection to war does
not rest at all upon moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead
rests solely upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expedi-
ency. 13 43 This continues to be the definition used.
As a result of this definition, a man may be entitled to a consci-
entious objector exemption from compulsory military service, but
he is nevertheless required to register for the draft if he is between
the ages of eighteen and twenty-six. 3 44 From the pool of those reg-
istered, an impartial process is to be used to select those who are to
be inducted into military service.3 45 Prior to induction, a registrant
is required to appear for examination and classification by the local
draft board.3 46 It is at this point, rather than upon registration, that
the conscientious objector can claim the exemption. 347 If he does
not object to military service but only to combatant service, he may
be inducted into the military but assigned only non-combatant du-
ties during his term of service.3 48 Alternatively, if he objects to all
military service, the local draft board director may assign him to
"civilian work contributing to the maintenance of the national
health, safety, or interest" for period of time equal to military
service. 34
9
It is useful to note that the conscientious objector exemption is
not the only exemption to compulsory military service. Only men
340. Id.
341. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
342. Id. at 344.
343. Id. at 342-43.
344. 50 App. U.S.C. § 453 (2000); United States v. Schmucker, 815 F.2d 413,
417 (6th Cir. 1987); United States v. Kerley, 787 F.2d 1147, 1148 n.] (7th Cir.
1986).
345. 50 App. U.S.C. § 455(a); 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1 (2008).
346. 50 App. U.S.C. § 454(a); 32 C.F.R. § 1621.3 (2008).
347. 50 App. U.S.C. § 454(a); 32 C.F.R. § 1636.2 (2008).
348. 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j).
349. Id.
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of certain ages required to register for compulsory military ser-
vice.3 50 In other words, all women and most men (i.e., those
outside of the age range) are excluded from compulsory military ser-
vice. 351 Those men who are not physically able or mentally able to
serve are not qualified to serve.352 Religious ministers are exempted
from service.3 53 Statutory deferments of service are available for
certain elected officials,3 54 those in certain occupations, 55 and stu-
dents,)3 5 6 while regulatory deferments are made available in certain
other situations, such as on the basis of hardship to dependents.
357
Thus, the military service provides several different types of excep-
tions: those not required to register; those disqualified by reason of
physical or mentality disability; those exempt as a result of being a
religious minister (regardless of the religion's beliefs about war);
and those deferred so long as certain conditions continue (such as
occupation, studies, or hardship) .35 These multiple exceptions are
ranked to address the possibility that a given individual might qual-
ify for more than one. 35 9 The conscientious objector status is the
last classification to which one is entitled, which means, for exam-
ple, if a man is both a student and conscientious objector, he will be
classified as a student.3
60
Since the conscientious exemption to military service is para-
digmatic and has a well-established history, it is a useful exemplar to
consider when proposing a similar exemption for jury service. As
with jury service, the government has an interest in compelling mili-
tary service regardless of preferences, under certain situations, yet
350. Id. § 453(a).
351. Id.
352. Id. § 454(a).
353. Id. § 456(g)(1).
354. Id. § 456(f).
355. See id. § 456(h).
356. Id. § 456(i).
357. 32 C.F.R § 1642.3 (2008).
358. So long as multiple nonreligious exemptions are provided from military
service, the Constitution arguably requires an exemption on religious grounds, un-
less the government can establish a compelling interest to deny a religious exemp-
tion. In other words, the free exercise arguments in favor of a jury exemption
could be used for a military exemption as well, but such arguments have no con-
temporary practical effect so long as the current military system exempts conscien-
tious objectors. Since the current interpretation of the military exemption statute
actually provides protection for non-religious objectors, it thereby seems likely to
provide greater protection than what could be deduced on the arguments for the
free exercise of religion.
359. 32 C.F.R § 1633.6 (2008).
360. Id.
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provides multiple exceptions. The test for conscientious objection
has evolved considerably. Initially, it was premised upon member-
ship in certain religious bodies, but, currently, it is focused on the
strength and nature of the individual's beliefs. Alternatives to mili-
tary service have evolved from solely government-controlled service
to civilian controlled alternatives for those who object to all govern-
ment service. Proposing a conscientious objector exception to jury
service modeled on the military exception allows the proposal to
gain leverage from the history of the military exemption, thus hope-
fully more efficiently providing a workable exception.
B. The Military Exemption and the Juy System
One important similarity between jury exemptions and military
exemptions is that both reflect two simultaneous risks. One is the
risk to the objector's conscience if forced to serve. Another is the
risk to the public interest if the objector serves. As important as is
the objector's right to religious freedom, it is important to remem-
ber that the exemption serves another purpose. In addition to the
interests of the objector, the military has a strong interest in exclud-
ing conscientious objectors from military service because they will
not obcy orders and will "detrimentally affect mission accomplish-
ment" and "moral and discipline."361 Similarly, an objector to jury
service will refuse to cooperate and otherwise be detrimental to the
"mission" of the jury system. Thus, in articulating an exemption, it
is as important to focus on eliminating objectors in order to serve
the public interest, as it is to consider the rights of the objectors
themselves.
While there is no statutory conscientious objector exemption
for jury service, the evolution of the military exemption provides
pragmatic insights on defining such an exemption. The standard
for the military exemption has evolved from membership in certain
groups into the current focus on the depth of belief. The standard
that currently operates in this realm is a mixture of statutory lan-
guage and Supreme Court interpretation .3 62 These two elements
may be synthesized as excusing any person whose conscience,
spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or religious beliefs forbids
such participation, so long as his or her opposition is not based
upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency.363 Al-
though the constitutional right to be conscientiously exempted
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from jury service is founded on a free exercise of religion argu-
ment, extending this exemption to those whose objection is based
on moral or ethical beliefs is advisable for two reasons. First, the
Supreme Court, when faced with a statute explicitly premising an
exemption on religion, interpreted the statute to include moral
and ethical beliefs, thereby avoiding the complex task of determin-
ing what is and is not a valid religion. 364 Second, granting religious
exemptions creates the risk of crossing the line between exempting
one individual because of his or her religious conscience and estab-
lishing a preference for certain religious principles. 65 For these
two practical reasons, it is best to avoid distinguishing between a
religious conscience and a non-religious conscience when both
make the same claim. Otherwise, defining what counts as "relig-
ious" becomes the central issue.
In comparing the military exemption and the jury system in
the context of articulating an exemption for the latter similar to the
one in the former, there are two guiding conclusions. First, an ex-
emption serves the dual purpose of respecting the conscience of
the individual and protecting the functional integrity of the govern-
ment activity. Second, the definition of conscientious objector
should avoid distinguishing between those who make the claim
from a religious conscience and those who make it from an equally
sincere, ethical but non-religious conscience.
C. Proposal
In order to protect the constitutional rights of those who con-
scientiously object to jury service, as well as the rights of the litigants
involved in jury trials, the jury system must be modified at both the
federal and state level. Federally, this would require amending the
stated purposes of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 to
include this protection as a goal of the federal jury system.3 66 The
local plans would then need to be amended to pursue the new goal.
On the state level, the relevant jury procedure statutes would need
to be amended. Both the local plans and statutory amendments
would need to address (1) where among current exceptions the
conscientious objector exception should be located and (2) who
should qualify for the conscientious objector exemption.
364. Although it is sometimes necessary for a court to define the "religious," it
is a complex task with significant pitfalls, such as judges favoring what is familiarly
religious over what is unorthodox. See GREENAWALT, supra note 320, at 125.
365. See id. at 60.
366. See 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (2006).
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In considering where in the existing scheme a conscientious
objector exemption should be placed, the objective should be to
locate the exemption in the scheme at the point that would remove
the objector as a potential juror as quickly and simply as possible, so
that there is no risk of the juror being impaneled, and with the
minimal use of time and other resources by the court and litigants.
In a state system such as Texas, this could be accomplished by deny-
ing an objector is "qualified" to serve on the jury,367 and, in the
federal system, the analogous provision would be to deny that the
objector is "competent. '' 368 Both of these categories preclude fur-
ther movement into the jury pool and impaneling system, which
would require the use of court or litigant resources to remove the
individual. This is the simplest point for eliminating all risk that
the objector becomes an obstinate juror. In the state system, the
issue of qualification is presented when the potential jurors are first
gathered,369 and, in the federal system, the issue of competence is
addressed in a questionnaire mailed to potential jurors' homes.370
There is no earlier point in the process in which to insert the con-
scientious exemption.
Drawing from the contemporary military exemption standard,
defining who should qualify for the jury exemption is not difficult.
Under a statutory scheme similar to the one in Texas, any potential
juror whose conscience, spurred by deeply held moral, ethical, or
religious beliefs, forbids such participation, would not be qualified
to serve as ajuror so long as his or her opposition to jury service is
not based upon considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expedi-
ency. 37 1 In the federal plans, such ajuror would not be considered
competent to serve. In the state system, an objector would claim to
meet this definition when the potential jurors are first gathered and
the issue of qualification is presented.3 72 In the federal system, the
exemption would be claimed on the questionnaire mailed to poten-
tial jurors' homes.3 73
367. TEX Gov'T CODE ANN. § 62.101 (Vernon 2005).
368. N.D. Tex. Jury Plan, supra note 77, at 8.
369. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 53, at § 67.22. As a practical matter,
jurors have likely already been given the opportunity to identify these issues in
writing. 49 TEX. JUR. 3D Jury § 54.
370. 1 FEDERAL JURY PRACrICE, supra note 9, at § 3.04.
371. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1970).
372. See, e.g., McCormick, supra note 53, at § 67.22. As a practical matter,
jurors have likely already been given the opportunity to identify these issues in
writing. 49 TEx. JUR. 3D Jury § 54.
373. N.D. Tex. Jury Plan, supra note 77, at 6-7.
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V.
CONCLUSION
Statutorily protecting conscientious objectors to jury service
from being impaneled protects both the interests of the objector
and the public interest in a duly functioning jury system. Amend-
ing the federal statute under which federal district courts issue their
jury plans, as well as amending those plans and state statutes regu-
lating jury procedures would be necessary. These amendments
should allow a conscientious objection exemption based on the ex-
emption provided in the military system, which does not distinguish
between ethical and religious opposition, so long as the opposition
is deeply held and unconditional. Those who qualify for this ex-
emption should be considered to fail qualification or competency
requirements for jury service.
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